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COMMENTS 
The Conservationists and the Public Lands: 
Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating 
to the Use and Disposition of the Public 
Lands Administered by the Department 
of the Interior 
Most of the land area of the United States has at some time been 
in the public domain and thus under the control of the federal gov-
ernment.1 As territories were acquired by the nation, title to the 
"vacant" lands passed to the federal government2 to be managed for 
future needs or to be disposed of in the course of westward expan-
sion.3 Today, nearly one third of those lands remain in federal 
hands.4 In addition, the federal government has acquired certain 
lands for specific purposes, such as for national parks and defense 
installations; and title to some lands previously disposed of by the 
Government has become "revested.''5 These public lands are con-
centrated in the western states and in Alaska, and many are ex-
tremely valuable for minerals, timber, grazing and recreation. 
With the exception of the national forests, which are administered 
by the Department of Agriculture, most of the lands in the public 
domain fall under the control of the Department of the Interior, 
whose Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is responsible for ad-
ministering nearly sixty per cent of the entire public domain.6 With 
that responsibility comes power to affect the utilization of the na-
tion's natural resources and the power over the people whose 
businesses and manner of living depend upon how the federal gov-
ernment, primarily through the Department of the Interior, exer-
cises its proprietorship. For example, the granting of a mineral lease 
may provide economic success to the lessee, while the withholding 
of a grazing permit may cause ruin for a rancher who is dependent 
upon federal forage lands. The purchase of land for game-manage-
ment purposes, while pleasing to hunters, may burden a local gov-
I. MAN ••• AN ENDANGERED SPECIES? 34 (U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Conservation 
Yearbook No. 4, 1967). 
2. A significant exception to this process was Texas, which, because it was a sover-
eign state prior to entering the federal union, retained control of its public lands. 
3. Article IV of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to "dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop· 
erty belonging to the United States." 
4. MAN ••• AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?, supra note I, at 34. 
5. Examples of "revested" lands are the Oregon and California railroad grant 
lands, and the Coos Bay Wagon Road grant lands. See Act of June 9, 1916, ch. 137, 
39 Stat. 218; Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 47, 40 Stat. 1179. See also 43 U.S.C. §§ 118l(a)•G) 
(1964). 
6. MAN ••• AN ENDANGERED SPECIES?, supra note 1, at 34. 
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ernment by removing property from its tax rolls;7 and the release 
of federal land to a state may, as in Alaska, mean a revenue windfall 
in mineral leases. 8 The granting of national park concessions and 
recreation permits on public lands can provide an economic boost 
to a local economy, or-like many other actions of the Department 
of the Interior, primarily those relating to mining rights or water-
shed utilization-it may enrage conservation groups who fear despoil-
ment of the wilderness. 
Because of the far-ranging responsibilities and powers of the 
Department of the Interior, the manner in which the Department 
makes its decisions and the procedures by which interested parties 
may be heard are extremely important. The purposes of this Com-
ment, then, are to examine the general structure and function of 
the Department of the Interior with respect to the use and dis-
position of the public lands and to analyze the manner in which 
persons may attain administrative and judicial review of the agency's 
actions. 
The scope of the Department's functions is vast, and the statutory 
and regulatory materials dealing with those functions are over-
whelming in their complexity and breadth.9 For that reason, this 
Comment will not seek to make an exhaustive examination of the 
agency's functions and procedures; rather, it will attempt to provide 
a selective illustration of the agency's procedures and functions and 
to concentrate on adjudicatory and review procedures, including 
judicial review. Because recent years have seen a marked increase in 
attention to resources and to conservation issues by persons and 
groups not otherwise directly concerned with the disposition of 
public lands, particular attention will be directed toward the avail-
ability of a forum for such third parties. 
I. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: FUNCTIONAL 
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE 
A. Functional Organization 
The Department is headed by the Secretary of the Interior, whose 
authority is delegated through a number of units headed by assistant 
. 
7. The impact on local tax revenues of public land ownership is of some concern. 
For a discussion of problems concerning state-owned public lands, see Note, Public 
Land in Minnesota: Should It Pay Compensation in Lieu of Taxation?, 54 MINN. L. 
REV. 179 (1969). 
8. In September 1969, the State of Alaska received bids in excess of $900,000,000 
for oil drilling rights on its "North Slope" lands. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1969, at 
63, col. 1. 
9. The Bureau of Land Management alone administers an estimated 5,000 public-
lands laws. Wheatley, A. Study of Administrative Procedures-The Department of In-
terior, 43 GEO. L.J. 166, 167 (1955). 
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secretaries:10 (I) Administration, (2) Water and Power Development,11 
(3) Mineral Resources,12 (4) Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine 
Resources,13 (5) Public Land Management including the Bureau of 
Land Management,14 and, (6) Water Quality and Research.15 Within 
these functional divisions, there is frequently a substantial degree of 
geographical decentralization. For example, the BLM-the division 
having responsibility £or the management of most of the federal 
public lands-maintains headquarters offices in eleven states;18 and 
each of these offices, termed "state" or "land" offices, supervises 
numerous district offices.17 
In addition to the foregoing administrative separation, there is 
a further degree of separation of functions within those areas them-
selves, aimed in part at separating decisions of discretion and 
policy from those involving administrative adjudication of legal and 
factual issues. Within the BLM, £or instance, there is an Office of 
Appeals and Hearings, which, in theory at least, 18 remains insulated 
from administrative adjudication in any given case until that case 
reaches that office on appeal to the Director of the Bureau. 
The Office of the Solicitor is the general legal advisor £or the 
Department of the Interior and is responsible in land matters for 
the handling of administrative appeals to the Secretary. That office 
is functionally organized to correspond with the administrative di-
visions of the Department. The Office of the Deputy Solicitor 
handles all appeals to the Secretary in land matters, including those 
relating to mineral leases and to homestead and grazing permits. 
Within that office is a Branch of Land Appeals in which are decided 
10. See McCarty, A View of the Decision-Making Process Within the Department 
of the Interior, 19 ABA AD. L. REv. 147, 152 (1966); U.S. Govr. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 
220-21 (1969-1970). 
11. The Water and Power Development division includes the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, and the Bonneville, Southeastern, and Southwestern Power Administrations. 
12. The Mineral Resources division includes the Bureau of Mines and the Geo• 
logical Survey. 
13. The Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources divisions include the 
Office of the Commissioner of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the National Park Service, and 
the Office of Marine Resources. 
14. The Public Land Management division also includes the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and the Office of Territories. 
15. The Water Quality and Research division includes the Federal Water Quality 
Administration, the Office of Saline Water, and the Office of Water Resources Research. 
16. U.S. Govr. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 217-47 (1969-1970). 
17. Id. 
18. That separation of functions is not perfect, and some dissatisfaction with a 
lack of apparent objectivity is reported. In part, that lack of assurance of objectivity 
in the resolution of legal issues stems from the discretionary powers of the Secretary, 
the Solicitor, and the Director of the BLM to enter and decide cases at almost any 
stage of the decisional process. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 172-74. 
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appeals from the Bureau of Land Management.19 Like other ad-
ministrative divisions of the Department, the office of the Solicitor is 
rather decentralized geographically; there are seven regional offices, 
each headed by a regional solicitor.20 
B. Procedures 
I. Adjudication 
General guidelines applicable to administrative adjudications in 
many, if not most, federal agencies are set forth in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (AP A).21 With regard to the Department of the 
Interior, however, the AP A procedures dealing with hearing re-
quirements are required in only a very limited number of cases.22 
Due in part perhaps to the multiplicity of functions of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, no over-all pattern of adjudication is present 
within the Department; and each division seems largely to follow 
its own specialized procedures, particularly with respect to appeals 
from administrative determinations. Most divisions of the Depart-
ment appear not to have established any uniform procedures for 
appeal from the local decision; at least, few such procedures appear 
in the published regulations.23 The BLM, however, within whose 
jurisdiction most of the Department's adjudications occur, has de-
veloped a detailed set of regulations.24 For the most part, the 
Bureau's adjudications concern applications for grazing permits or 
recreational-use permits, and for mineral leases and timber sales. 
a. Initial determinations. Applications for dispositions of lands 
and minerals are generally initiated in the appropriate land office of 
the BLM,211 except that those relating to grazing26 or to some smaller 
19. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 152. 
20. U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION MANUAL 222 (1969-1970). 
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
22. Those procedures are set forth generally in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968), but are applicable only when a "hearing" is required by the statute covering 
the particular administrative function. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
See generally McCarty, supra note IO, at 158, 178-80. 
23. See generally C. McFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 
154-82 (1969) [hereinafter McFARLAND]; McCarty, supra note 10, at 154. An extreme 
example is the National Park Service, whose published regulations provide no guide-
lines at all for appellate action by an aggrieved applicant. Although the Park Service 
has developed extensive regulations for processing claims, those regulations are pub-
lished as a manual rather than as regulations. See McFARLAND 118-21. For a discussion 
of the tendency for procedural regulations to be circulated only within a department, 
hence causing difficulty for persons who seek to learn what procedures to follow, see 
McFARLAND 263-71. For a discussion of the problems which that tendency may cause 
with regard to exhaustion of administrative remedies for judicial review, see text 
accompanying notes 264-73 infra. 
24. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1700-6232 (1969). 
25. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1821.2-1 (1969). See generally McFARLAND 165. 
26. For a discussion of special procedures relating to grazing, see McFARLAND 101-03. 
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timber sales and certain special permits are handled by the district 
office or other delegated officials.27 The factual inquiry upon which 
the initial determination must be based need not, in most cases, 
be a formal hearing.28 Formal hearings are mandatory in only a 
small number of situations such as grazing cases29 and "contests."30 
In general, there are three methods by which the BLM makes ad-
judications: mandatory hearings, discretionary hearings, and ex 
parte determinations. Mandatory hearings are subject to the AP A 
hearing provisions31 and are held before a trial examiner who 
meets the requirements of that Act,32 although in the case of grazing 
applications, there is a preliminary determination by the district 
manager, and the actual hearing is held only on "appeal" to the 
examiner.33 In nearly all other cases, the initial determination is 
made by the land office which has jurisdiction for the area.34 There 
is provision in the regulations for a discretionary hearing, which may 
be granted by the Director of the BLM either upon request of an 
applicant appealing from an initial decision or upon request of an 
"adverse party."35 If the request for such a hearing is granted, the 
case will be heard by an examiner, who, in discretionary hearings, 
is termed a "field commissioner." 
There are significant differences in procedure between the re-
quired hearings and the discretionary hearings. In the required 
hearings, governed by the AP A, the hearing examiner has full au-
thority to control the issues for which evidence is to be received. 
But in the case of a discretionary hearing, the field commissioner 
lacks that authority; instead, the Director, in ordering the hear-
27. McFARLAND 165 n.103. 
28. McFARLAND 165 n.107, citing generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); and Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 
(1966). 
29. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1853.1-.6 (1969). 
30. 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1 (1969). Hearings may also be required in cases involving cer-
tain mineral claims [30 U.S.C. §§ 613, 621 (1964)], and in some cases involving statutory 
preferences for certain "possessory claims" such as the claims of Alaskan natives to 
nonmineral lands which are under control and actual occupation. 43 C.F.R. § 1855 
(1969). 
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-56 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
32. The APA requirements relating to hearing examiners are now found in 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 1305, 3105, 3344, ~362, 7521 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
33. The procedures for the preliminary determination are set forth in 43 C.F.R. 
§§ 4115.2-l(a)-(c) (1969); provisions governing appeal to the examiner and hearings are 
found in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1853.1-.6 (1969). 
34. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 157-58. 
35. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969). ''Adverse party" is not defined in this regulation; and 
it is not clear what is meant by the term, for if the party is sufficiently adverse so as 
to be involved in a contest with the applicant, there is a right to a hearing. 43 C.F.R. 
§ 1852.l-7(b) (1969). 
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ing, designates the issues upon which evidence is to be received.36 
In a required hearing, the parties submit to the examiner briefs and 
proposed findings of fact and law, from which he ordinarily issues 
an initial decision ruling on those issues.37 In a discretionary hear-
ing, however, the commissioner does not make the initial decision, 
but is limited to making proposed findings to be used by the Director. 
Moreover, in the discretionary hearing, there is no provision for 
submission of briefs to the commissioners and no opportunity for a 
party to see the proposed findings before they are sent to the 
Director.38 
Whatever shortcomings there may be in the procedures govern-
ing discretionary hearings, they are of little note, for the discre-
tionary hearing is seldom used.39 Due in part, perhaps, to its heavy 
caseload, the Department has been reluctant to grant a hearing 
unless it is required to do so.40 Hence, the determination of ap-
plications in the great majority of cases is made ex parte-that is, 
factual issues are decided under circumstances in which the applicant 
does not have a right to meet all the evidence adverse to his posi-
tion.41 In fact, in most cases, once the applicant has complied with 
the application details-for which there are generally abundant 
instructions42-and has submitted his application, he has little way 
36. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969). 
37. The governing provisions are found in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1852.3-8(b), 1853.5(c), 
1853.6(a) (1969). However, in "designated cases"-the meaning of which is unclear-
the Director may require that, even in a mandatory hearing, the examiner make only 
a recommended decision, to be submitted to the Director for further consideration, 
in the course of which he may make additional findings and conclusions. 43 C.F .R. 
§ 1852.3-8(c) (1969). Such additional findings are apparently limited to issues and 
evidence brought forth in the hearing-that is, unlike the situation in ex parte deter-
minations (see text following note 40 infra), the Director cannot go outside the record 
for his supporting material. 
38. In sending the record to the Director, the parties are permitted to include 
whatever briefs or statements they wish; but because of the unavailability of the pro-
posed findings, such briefs may have either little relevance or inadequate responsive-
ness to the issues considered most important by the Commissioner in his proposed 
findings. See generally McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-80. The public-information 
provisions of the APA do not apply to such material. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968). 
39. See McFARLAND 168. 
40. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 155-57. 
41. The term "ex parte" is used here in a broader sense than it is with reference 
to judicial proceedings. The description is from McCarty, supra note 10, at 175. 
42. The specificity and number of instructions relating to applications for patents, 
leases, permits, or contracts are in marked contrast to the sparsity of published regula-
tions relating to other departmental procedures. There is some exception, however, 
with respect to BLM appeals procedures; see note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
See generally McFARLAND 263-74, for a discussion of problems of public information 
about the departmental procedures. For an example of the specificity required in ap-
plications for even relatively minor dispositions, see instructions for applications under 
1206 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1200 
of knowing what is happening to his application, and no way of 
finding out, unless he knows people in the administrative structure 
and is persistent in approaching field officials.43 There may be in-
formal conferences and questions in the course of evaluating the 
application, but there is no established procedure whereby an ap-
plicant can know with certainty what is happening to his application 
or what steps should be taken to remedy its defects.44 In most in-
stances, the application simply disappears into the administrative 
machinery; and the applicant does not know what goes into his file, 
who sees it, or upon what data the decision is made.45 Because of 
these apparent shortcomings in the initial determination process, 
administrative appeal in this area is particularly important for the 
applicant. But for the same reason, such appeal is difficult for him 
to pursue effectively. 
b. Administrative appeals. The BLM, in contrast to most other 
agencies within the Department of the Interior, has highly developed 
appeals procedures.46 Any party to the case who is adversely affected 
by the initial determination, whether by hearing or ex parte de-
cision, can appeal to the Director simply by filing, within sixty days 
of the decision, a notice of appeal in the office within which the 
initial decision was made.47 Receipt of a statement of reasons for 
the appeal is a prerequisite to consideration by the office of the 
Director.48 That statement may either be contained in the notice 
of appeal49 or sent directly to the Director within thirty days after 
filing notice of appeal. 5° Concurrent with the appeal, the appellant 
may request a hearing on factual issues;51 but, as has been indicated, 
the Director is reluctant to grant such hearings. 52 Following an ad-
Recreation and Public Purposes Act, 43 U.S.C. § 869 (1964), in U.S. DEPI'. OF THE 
INTERIOR, COMMUNITY RECREATION AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 26-38 (1963). 
43. See McFARLAND 166. 
44. There may be procedures established within the Department, but knowledge 
of them is seldom available to the applicant. Even if there has been "publication" by 
the Department, it may have been lost in obscurity in the Federal Register or pub-
lished in the form of a news release, departmental pamphlet, or other limited publi-
cation, in which case effective notice to the applicant or to his lawyer is problematical 
at best. See generally McFARLAND 265-74. 
45. McFARLAND 265-74; McCarty, supra note IO, at 177. 
46. The general appeal provisions of the Bureau of Land Management are con-
tained in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1842-44 (1969). For a discussion of the absence of similar pro-
cedures in other agencies, see McFARLAND 172. 
47. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4 (1969) (general procedure); 43 C.F.R. § 1853.7 (1969) (graz-
ing); 43 C.F.R. § 1852.3-9 (1969) (contests). 
48. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.5-1 (1969). 
49. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4(a) (1969). 
50. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.5-1 (1969). 
51. 43 C.F.R. § 1843.5 (1969). 
52. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
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verse decision by the Director, there is usually a right to pursue the 
appeal to the Secretary.153 That right may be exercised by filing with 
the Director notice of appeal to the Secretary;54 provisions relating 
to a statement of reasons for appeal are the same as in the case of 
an appeal to the Director.155 There is no further administrative ap-
peal after a decision has been rendered by the Secretary,56 although 
there may be an opportunity to petition the Secretary for recon-
sideration.157 
Although the appeals procedures outlined in the departmental 
regulations with respect to appeals from BLM determinations are 
essentially the same for determinations made at hearings and for 
those made ex parte, the origin of the appeal may, in practice, make 
a substantial difference in the handling of the case. The crucial 
difference is that in the case of appeals arising from hearings, 
whether required or discretionary, appellate consideration is limited 
to facts and issues contained in the record, 58 whereas in the case of 
appeals from ex parte determinations no comparable record is avail-
able. In the latter, moreover, the actual basis of decision-on appeal, 
as well as in the initial determination-may depend on factors and 
data of which the applicant has had no notice or knowledge.59 In-
deed, in some instances, during appeal from ex parte determinations 
the Bureau may make an additional ex parte investigation, of which 
the appellant may have no knowledge; and even if he does know 
of the investigation, he is not able, as a practical matter, even to see 
the report prior to decision, much less to inquire into the reliability 
or accuracy of the investigation. 60 
The picture of the Department's application and appeal prac-
tices, then, is one of rather loose procedural requirements governing 
agency action. The Department enjoys a great deal of administrative 
discretion with respect to its proprietorship over the public lands, 
and that discretion apparently is thought to carry over to the pro-
cedural restrictions which it applies to itself.61 In contrast, the De-
53. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.1 (1969). 
54. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.2 (1969). 
55. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.3 (1969). 
56. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.9 (1969). 
57. See, e.g., B.E. Burnaugh, 67 Interior Dec. 366 (1960); McCarty, supra note 10, at 
159. 
58. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. §§ 1840.0·8, 1853.9 (1969). 
59. See generally McFARLAND 171-73; McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-80. 
60. See McFarland 172; McCarty, supra note 10, at 177-78. See also Robertson v. 
Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Verna I. Clancy, Sacramento No. 072,582 
(April 13, 1965) (Interior Dec.). But cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), dis-
cussed in note 295 infra. 
61. McFARLAND 158. See also, with respect to Departmental discretion, the discus-
sions on classifications, in the text accompanying note 66 infra and on judicial review 
in the text accompanying notes 277-310 infra. 
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partment expects persons dealing with the agency to adhere strictly 
to procedure. True, the procedures for appeal are not particularly 
complex; and the requirements for filing are made clear in the 
departmental regulations.62 But those rules are very strictly con-
strued, and failure to conform with rules concerning the content of 
an appeal or with filing deadlines, for example, results in summary 
dismissal. 63 Even when summary dismissal under the regulations is 
discretionary, 64 the apparent practice of the Department is to dismiss 
in all cases, presumably in order to minimize its case load.65 
2. Classification 
a. Nature and purpose. The basic policy question of the gen-
eral use to which public lands should be put is seldom in issue in 
adjudications and appeals of the sort outlined above. Instead, such 
broader issues are disposed of in advance of any adjudication in-
volving a particular claimant; and the process by which such prior 
determination is made is known generally as "classification."00 
Classification is somewhat analogous to zoning, in that it limits the 
range of uses to which the public lands may be subject.07 The 
Secretary of the Interior has long held discretionary authority under 
the Taylor Grazing Act68 to classify lands which fall within the scope 
of that Act.<m Today, under the Classification and Multiple Use Act 
of 1964,70 the Secretary has an affirmative duty to classify all public 
lands administered exclusively by him through the BLM. Classifica-
tion under the latter statute is for the purpose of determining first, 
which lands should be disposed of by the federal government and 
which should be retained and managed, and second, with respect 
to those lands'which are to be retained, to what use they should be 
put. 
In view of the strong public interest in the manner in which 
public lands are used generally, and the strong private interest which 
62. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1850-53 (1969). 
63. See McCarty, supra note 10, at 164-68. 
64. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-7 (1969). 
65, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT MANUAL§ 1843.2; McCarty, supra note 10, at 167. 
66. See generally McFARLAND 10-18. 
67. Classification seems to be more concerned with general land-use planning than 
with the spot disposition of a particular piece of land. Indeed, through disposal of 
land to localities, the Department of the Interior appears to be able to exert con• 
siderable influence on the manner in which a local government chooses to plan its 
land use. 43 U.S.C. § 1422 (1964) prohibits the disposition of public lands under 43 
U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) unless the local government has first enacted zoning regulations, 
and the regulations of the Department require that such zoning be "adequate." 43 
C.F.R. § 2410.l-3(b), (c) (1969). See generally McFARLAND 13-14. 
68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-15(g), 315(h)-15(m), 315(n), 315(0)-l (1964). 
69. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315(£) (1964). 
70. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964). 
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often exists in the use of particular public lands, the classification 
decision assumes substantial importance. To the extent that the 
Secretary is bound by his promulgated regulations and classifications, 
a classification may significantly narrow the range of choice on sub-
sequent applications. Thus, for example, if an area of land has been 
classified for wilderness preservation, an applicant seeking to use the 
land for mineral production or industrial development may find 
that his claim had been effectively disposed of well in advance of his 
application. From another perspective, if a conservation group or 
local citizen wants to object to an application for timber or mineral 
rights to land, and if that land has been classified for such develop-
ment, the objector has little basis upon which to object either in 
the administrative process or, as will be seen, in the courts.71 
Skeletal criteria to guide classification are included in the 1964 
statute, but the guideposts seem spaced widely enough to leave con-
siderable room for the exercise of discretion in the promulgation 
and subsequent application of regulations under the statute.72 The 
statute requires that all classifications be made in accordance with 
statute or regulation, 73 and the regulations issued under this statute 
are themselves sufficiently broad that they do not confine the broad 
administrative discretion conferred by the statute.74 
In addition to the 1964 Act which establishes this general 
classification process, numerous other statutory provisions make 
classification a prerequisite to the disposal of certain lands.75 In such 
71. See text accompanying notes 328-47 infra. 
72. The Secretary is to develop and promulgate regulations for the disposal of 
lands that are either required for the orderly growth and development of a com-
munity or chiefly valuable for residential, commercial, agricultural (exclusive of lands 
chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops), industrial, or public uses or 
development. Similarly the Secretary is to issue regulations for the retention and 
federal management of lands for (1) domestic livestock grazing, (2) fish and wildlife 
development and utilization, (3) industrial development, (4) mineral production, (5) 
occupancy, (6) outdoor recreation, (J) timber production, (8) watershed protection, 
(9) wilderness preservation, or (10) preservation of public values that would be lost if 
the land passed from federal ownership. 43 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1964). The statute also 
provides that, in making his determination, the Secretary shall "give due considera-
tion to all pertinent factors, including, but not limited to, ecology, priorities of use, 
and the relative values of the various resources in particular areas." 43 U.S.C. § 1411(b) 
(1964). 
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(I) (1964). 
74. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary under the statute are similarly 
broad, consisting largely of a verbose repetition of the content of the statute. See 43 
C.F.R. §§ 2410.1-1 to -.1-3 (1969). See also text accompanying notes 138-40, 333-36 
infra. 
75. The statutes are enumerated in 43 C.F.R. § 2410.0-3 (1969) and include, in part, 
provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315(f)-(g) (1964); Isolated Tracts 
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1171 (1964); Small Tracts Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 682(a)-(e) (1964); Recreation 
and Public Purposes Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 869(1)-(4) (1964); Public Land Sale Act, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1421-27 (1964); and the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 
u.s.c. §§ 1411-18 (1964). 
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situations, applications for land often involve a two-step process, 
in which the applicant must first seek an appropriate classification 
for the particular tract of land and thereafter pursue his application 
in the usual manner.76 Such classifications by petition differ from 
the more general classification required by the 1964 Act in that they 
usually apply only to a small tract, whereas general classifications 
may apply to a large area. Even though classifications by petition 
are limited to small tracts, however, their impact may go beyond the 
immediate parties and lands. Subsequent general classifications and 
policies will have to take into consideration existing uses-and hence 
the previous limited classifications.77 Moreover, the decision-making 
process in a classification by petition may include the announcement 
of policies of more general application.78 Thus, the manner by which 
even small individual classifications are made may be of more general 
concern, for "[n]ot infrequently, as one strand in this gigantic web 
is moved, another starts to vibrate."79 
b. Procedures for classification. Classification procedures and 
criteria are set out in broad terms in the 1964 statute80 and in some-
what more specific terms in the regulations. 81 Classification may be 
triggered by an applicant in a petition-application or, for large-tract 
classifications, may be initiated by an "authorized officer."82 The 
same basic classification procedures are followed regardless of how 
the classification was initiated. In the case of classifications for dis-
posal of land, 83 the state director of the BLM is to serve notice of a 
76. McFARLAND 16-17. In many instances, there is a combined procedure, whereby 
an applicant includes with his application a "petition for classification." See 43 C.F.R. 
§ 2411.1-1 (1969). 
77. The 1964 legislation requires the Secretary to considei: "aU pertinent factors" 
in determining a classification. 43 U.S.C. § 14ll(b) (1964). The regulations include as 
pertinent factors present and potential uses and minimum disturbance of existing 
users. 43 C.F.R. § 2410.1-1 (1969). 
78. See, e.g., Hugh S. Ritter, 72 Interior Dec. Ill (1965), a case which involved 
only forty acres of land and two applicants, but in which the Secretary announced a 
policy that no California lands irrigable by the Colorado River would be classified 
for public entry until the water shortage was cured. The decision was of interest to 
persons in a large area, but was reached in a relatively minor case of which the public 
affected by the decision had no effective notice. 
79. McCarty, supra note 10, at 147. 
80. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1412, 1414 (1964). 
81. 43 C.F.R. § 2411 (1969). 
82. Who is an "authorized officer" for purposes of initiating a classification is not 
entirely clear from the regulations. In the case of classifications by petition, the au-
thorized officer is whoever makes the preliminary determination and forwards the 
proposed classification to the state director. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(b) (1969). But in the 
case of a Department-initiated classification, whether for disposal [43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-2 
(1969)] or retention [43 C.F.R. § 2411.2 (1969)], the reference is merely to an "au-
thorized officer." 
83. The regulations distinguish between a classification for the disposal of land 
and a classification for the retention of land for federal management under the 
Sustained Use and Multiple Yield Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1413, 1415 (1964). 
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proposed classification decision, with supporting reasons, on any 
petitioner-applicants, 84 on any grazing permittee or lessee on the 
land,85 on the District Advisory Board,86 on any local governing 
body having zoning jurisdiction over the area,87 and on "any gov-
ernmental official ... from whom the record discloses comments on 
the classification have been received."88 For a period of thirty days 
following service of a proposed disposal classification, any interested 
party may file a protest with the state director, 89 who then "may" 
require such statements and testimony, or conduct such further field 
investigations, as he deems necessary.90 After having reviewed any 
protests, the state director issues the initial classification decision, 91 
which is then subject to the general supervisory authority of the 
Secretary for an additional thirty days, during which period the 
Secretary may alter the classification on motion of a petitioner-
applicant, or motion of any protestant, or on his own motion.92 
Upon expiration of that period, the initial classification decision 
becomes the final order of the Secretary,93 subject only to his con-
tinuing power to vacate or modify it "personally and not through a 
delegate."94 
If the disposal classification is to apply to a large tract of land, 
there must be compliance with certain additional notice and hear-
ing requirements. In such cases, publication of the proposed classi-
fication must be made both in the Federal Register and in a news-
paper having general circulation in the vicinity of the affected 
land.95 Moreover, notice must be sent directly not only to those who 
must be notified of any small-tract classification decision,96 but also 
to certain other governmental officials97 and to "any other party the 
authorized officer determines to have an interest in the proper use 
of the lands."98 The foregoing procedure must be followed in any 
84. 43 C.F.R. § 24ll.l•l(c)(l)(i) (1969). 
85. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(ii) (1969). 
86. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(iii) (1969). 
87. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(iv) (1969). 
88. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(c)(l)(v) (1969). 
89. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d)(l) (1969). 
90. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-l(d)(3) (1969). 
91. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-l(d)(3) (1969). 
92. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e) (1969). 
93. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e)(l) (1969). 
94. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-1{£)(2) (1969). 
95. 43 U.S.C. § 1412 (1964); 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969). 
96. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra. 
97. These officials include the head of the local governing body, the state governor, 
the BLM multiple-use advisory board for the state, and the county land-use planning 
officer or committee. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969). 
98. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) {1969). 
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disposition classification involving more than 2,560 acres; and if the 
proposed classification affects more than 25,000 acres, the "authorized 
officer" is required to hold a "public hearing" as well.99 The regula-
tions permit the authorized officer to hold a public hearing for 
smaller dispositions if "he determines that sufficient public interest 
exists to warrant the time and expense of a hearing."100 However, 
in view of the rather negative phrasing of this regulation, and in 
view of the reluctance of the BLM to hold public hearings in any 
rule making, 101 it seems unlikely that authorized officials will avail 
themselves of that authority with much frequency. Administrative 
review by the Secretary of large-tract disposition classifications is 
essentially the same as for small tracts,102 except that additional 
publication in the Federal Register is required.103 
When a proposed classification favors the retention of public 
lands in public ownership for purposes of managing those lands for 
multiple use and sustained yield, the classification procedures are 
somewhat different. Rather surprisingly, they are more strict for 
retention than for disposal. Proposed retention classifications must 
be indicated on a map which is publicly available in the local BLM 
district office.104 Publication in the Federal Register and in a local 
newspaper is required for proposed retention classifications for large 
tracts105 and is permitted for smaller tracts; and notice of any re-
tention classification must be sent not only to the parties who have 
a right to notice in disposition classifications,106 but also to licensees, 
lessees, and permittees, and to "any other parties indicating interest 
in such classifications."107 The period for receiving comments on the 
proposal is, in this situation, at least sixty days,108 as opposed to only 
thirty days in the case of disposal classifications. Following the ex-
piration of that period, the proposed classification becomes the initial 
classification, which is then subject to administrative review by the 
Secretary, presumably on the same basis as are other classification 
decisions.109 
99. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b) (1969). Such hearing is not required by the statute; 
thus, this is one of the few instances in the public-lands area in which departmental 
regulations narrow somewhat the discretion permitted under the statute. 
100. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(b)(2) (1969). 
101. The public-lands agencies are exempt from § 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968), which requires notice and sometimes hearings in rule making; 
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Although there is usually voluntary compli-
ance wi:.h notice considerations, "hearings" are infrequent. See McFARLAND 245 n.110. 
102. See text accompanying note 92 supra. 
103. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(d) (1969). 
104. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a), (b) (1969). 
105. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969). 
106. See note 97 supra. 
107. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969). 
108. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969). 
109. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(c) (1969). Administrative review is limited under 43 C.F.R. 
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3. Third-Party Interests 
a. In adjudications. Because of the public importance of the 
use of the public lands generally, and because that public interest 
may extend even to small dispositions,11° the handling of third-party 
objections to decisions affecting the public lands assumes substantial 
importance. As indicated previously, it seems that the administrative 
procedures-particularly the appellate procedures-relating to pub-
lic-land uses and dispositions fail to provide fully adequate protec-
tion for the applicants themselves.111 That protection withers away 
almost entirely when the interests of third parties are in question. 
Under the AP A there is a general right for any interested person to 
appear before an agency in order to make known his views "so far 
as the orderly conduct of public business permits."112 But the De-
partment of the Interior's regulations generally fail to emphasize, or 
even to provide, specific procedures for such appearances.113 In 
initial determinations not involving a hearing, an interested party 
is accorded the status of a "protestant"114 and has the right to file a 
protest with the officer who makes the initial decision. In the case 
of homestead entries, in which the applicant is claiming a statutory 
right or preference for which he is required to prove his eligibility,1115 
a protestant, in addition to merely filing a protest, may appear as a 
witness before the officer examining the claim.116 In either case, the 
action to be taken on a protest appears to lie entirely within the 
discretion of the officer, who is to take such action "as is deemed 
appropriate in the circumstances."117 When a hearing is required, 
as in cases involving grazing permits and in contested cases, third 
parties may be accorded status as intervenors; but that decision too 
is subject to administrative discretion.118 
With respect to procedures for administrative appeal, the rights 
of third parties are even more nebulous. It seems that generally 
§ 2411.l-l(e)(2), (4) (1969) to petitioning the Secretary; no other review or appeal by 
an applicant or protestant is allowed. 
110. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. 
111. See text accompanying notes 37-45, 58-65 supra. 
112. APA § 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
113. See McFARLAND 166 n.111. 
114. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1-2 (1969) (protests). 
115. 43 u.s.c. § 251 (1964). 
116. 43 C.F.R. § 1823.1-2 (1969). A hearing-type proceeding is involved in this 
situation; but it is not the type provided for by the APA. There is no right to con-
front witnesses; in fact, all testimony is given in private to the examiner alone, 43 
C.F.R. § 1823.2-2 (1969), with cross-examination available only to the governmental 
officer. 43 C.F.R. § 1823.2-1 (1969). 
117. 43 C.F.R. § 1852.1-2 (1969). 
118. In grazing-permit cases, in which a hearing is required by statute, any person 
who "in the opinion of the district manager may be directly affected by the decision" 
may be notified and recognized as an intervenor. 43 C.F.R. § 1853.2 (1969). 
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there is no right of appeal for third parties; the regulations allow 
appeal to the Director only for "any party to the case who is adversely 
affected."119 For appeals to the Secretary from the Director's de-
cision, however, the regulations are somewhat broader, omitting the 
words "to the case."120 Hence, if "party" were construed broadly to 
include any person, it might seem that there would be a right to 
appeal to the Secretary in the unlikely event that it was not necessary 
first to have pursued an appeal to the Director, for which there 
would not have been standing under the regulations. Perhaps pre-
liminary appeal to the Director would not be necessary when a 
lower official's decision is deemed to be that of the Director. It seems, 
however, that such vicarious approval usually occurs only after the 
expiration of a period in which to pursue an appeal to the Director, 
and the regulations specifically preclude appeal to the Secretary 
when the party adversely affected has failed to appeal from the 
initial decision.121 Hence, it appears unlikely that in the ordinary 
case a third party could successfully base standing for appeal on 
the omission of the words "to the case" in the regulation dealing with 
appeal to the Secretary; only in the rare instance in which the Direc-
tor himself had entered a case at the outset might a third-party 
appeal to the Secretary be predicated on that ground. 
The availability of a third-party appeal seems further limited by 
the posture which the Department has indicated in its case decisions, 
in which "party" appears to be construed quite strictly.122 The De-
partment may permit some distinction, however, according to the 
degree of the interest possessed by the third party; and a person who 
has some personal stake in the subject matter, even though his 
interest is not sufficient to make him a party to the case, has a 
better chance of being considered an " 'adversely affected' party" 
than does a "self-appointed guardian of the public interest."123 
Moreover, if standing to be a party has been erroneously denied by 
the Director, the Secretary may permit an appeal even though the 
appellant is not formally a party to the case.124 
b. In classification. Because classification decisions are poten-
tially more far-ranging than are most individual adjudications, it 
might be expected that the classification process would accord greater 
recognition to third-party interests than is the case with the ad-
119. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.2 (1969) (emphasis added). 
120. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.I (1969). 
121. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.I (1969). 
122. See, e.g., John J. Farrelly, 62 Interior Dec. I (1965); United States Steel Corp., 
63 Interior Dec. 318 (1956). 
123. See McFARLAND 84 n.132, citing Wight v. Dubois, 21 F. 693 (C.C. Colo. 1884); 
and Neilson v. Champagne Mining&: Milling Co., 119 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1902) (mining 
lease cases). 
124. Godfrey Nordmark, 65 Interior Dec. 299 (1958). 
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judicatory process. Such greater recognition would be particularly 
appropriate in light of the fact that, because classification proceed-
ings are not adjudicatory in the sense of being adversary, all persons 
interested in the classification decision are third parties. Indeed, the 
recognition of third-party interests might extend even to the in-
terests of the "self-appointed guardians of the public interest." 
Under current departmental regulations, however, treatment of third 
parties in the classification process is even more dependent upon 
administrative discretion than it is in the adjudicatory process. 
Notice of classification is given to certain specified interested 
parties,125 but only in retention classifications can those persons who 
have previously indicated general interest in classifications be assured 
of receiving notice of proposed classifications.126 After notice of a 
proposed classification has been served on those specified persons, any 
person-whether or not he is one upon whom notice is required to 
be served-may file with the state Director a protest regarding that 
proposed classification. Protests may be filed anytime within thirty 
days in the case of small-tract disposal classifications,127 and within 
sixty days in the case of retention classifications and large-tract dis-
posal classifications.128 Moreover, for large-tract disposal and reten-
tion classifications, the authorized officer may hold a "public hear-
ing.''129 But no specific procedures are set forth to govern such public 
hearings; apparently these hearings are simply an opportunity for 
the interested public to be heard, after which the authorized officer 
is free to make whatever initial classification decision he wishes, so 
long as he remains within the broad confines of the general classifica-
tion criteria.130 
The regulations are extremely vague with respect to procedures 
for administrative appeal from classification decisions. The only 
language directly treating appeals in this area is ambiguous as to 
whether the standard appeal procedures are applicable to classifica-
tion decisions.131 If the standard appeal provisions are applicable, 
125. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.1-l(c), .l-2(b), .2(a) (1969). See text accompanying notes 83-
88 supra. 
126. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(a) (1969). 
127. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d) (1969). 
128. 43 C.F.R. §§ 24ll.l-2(c), 24ll.2(a) (1969). The regulations do not clearly in-
dicate with whom protests concerning large-tract dispositions or retentions should be 
filed. For small-tract dispositions, the protest is filed with the state Director; but for 
others, the regulations speak only of the "authorized officer." 
129. 43 C.F.R. § 24ll.l-2(b), 24ll.2(a) (1969). See text accompanying notes 99-101 
supra. 
130. These criteria are set forth in 43 C.F.R. § 2410 (1969) (discussed in text ac-
companying note 81 supra), and more generally in 43 C.F.R. §§ 1725, 1727 (1969). 
131. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l(e)(4) (1969) provides: 
No petitioner-applicant or protestant to a proposed classification decision of a 
State Director to whom the provisions of, this section are applicable shall be 
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the classification area might possibly be an instance in which an 
aggrieved third party would have standing to appeal to the Secretary, 
without first having met the stricter provisions concerning appeal to 
the Director, since in this situation-at least with regard to small-
tract disposal classifications-the initial decision is made by the 
state Director.132 On the other hand, the appeal provision, strictly 
construed, precludes all administrative review except that provided 
in that section-namely, a right to petition the Secretary to exercise 
his supervisory authority.133 A strict reading of the provision might 
also indicate, however, that the specified appeal procedure applies 
only to that particular section, which relates solely to those classi-
fication decisions involving petition-applications for small-tract dis-
posals. So read, this provision says nothing about appeals from large-
tract disposal classifications or from retention classifications. 
The regulations which deal specifically with appeals from large-
tract disposal or retention classifications are even more unclear with 
respect to the rights of third parties than is the foregoing provision 
found in the classification-by-petition section. No specific procedures 
are provided for review of large-tract disposal and retention classi-
fications, although the large-tract disposal sections seem to anticipate 
that the Secretary will exercise his supervisory authority after having 
received motions from interested persons or protestants.134 In the 
case of retention classifications, no reference is made to "supervisory 
authority"; rather, the reference is simply to "administrative review 
by the Secretary," and it is not clear how that review is to be trig-
gered. If the review provision found in the classification-by-petition 
section is read as not applying to other forms of classification, it may 
be that the standard forms of review-precluded for classifications 
by petition-do apply to other types of classifications.135 But even 
if those standard forms of review do so apply, it is scant comfort 
to the protestant, for, as has been shown, he is likely to be barred 
from using the standard appeal provisions.136 At best, it seems that 
the most the interested third party can expect by way of appeal from 
an initial classification decision is merely to petition the Secretary 
to exercise administrative review or general supervisory authority. 
entitled to any administrative review other than that provided by this section 
or to appeal under provisions of Parts 1840 and 1850 [the general appeal pro-
visions] of this chapter. 
132. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(d)(l), (3) (1969). For a discussion of the difference in 
standards for appeal between appeal to the Director and appeal to the Secretary, see 
text accompanying notes 119-21 supra. 
133. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-l(e)(2) (1969). 
134. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-2(d) (1969). 
135. Those standard review procedures are found in 43 C.F.R. pts. 1840, 1850 
(1969), and, because of the provision set forth in note 131 supra, are apparently in-
applicable to review of petition-classification decisions. 
136. See text accompanying notes 119-24 supra. 
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Nevertheless, the inability of third parties to utilize standard 
appeal procedures should not be accorded great importance, for 
even if there were a right of appeal from a classification decision, 
such appeal would probably be futile because of what can well be 
described as a tremendous loophole in the area of administrative 
control of the classification process. That administrative gap stems 
from the provision that lands are to be segregated from conflicting 
uses after a proposed classification has been announced. The purpose 
of such segregation, as contemplated by the 1964 statute, is eminently 
reasonable: to prevent harm to public lands during the period be-
tween proposal of a classification and its effective date.137 Thus, after 
a proposed classification is announced, the land becomes segregated 
from all uses which would be inconsistent with the proposed classi-
fication;138 and, conversely, the land is open to uses which are con-
sistent with the proposed classification. The potential hiatus in 
administrative supervision occurs as follows. The segregative effect 
takes place upon the authorized officer's announcement of the pro-
posed classification; but administrative review, however achieved, 
does not, and cannot, according to the regulations, take place until 
the initial decision has been made and notice of it published.139 
During the period between proposal of classification and announce-
ment of an initial classification decision, there is no administrative 
review under the regulations; yet the segregative effect of the pro-
posal is operative. The duration of that period runs up to two years 
and can be extended for another two years if the authorized officer 
gives notice of a proposed continuance.140 
Thus, insofar as can be determined from the published regula-
tions, it seems that the administrative official who first proposes a 
classification can significantly narrow the range of alternative classi-
fications. For example, if the authorized officer proposes to classify 
certain lands for mineral production or other development, the 
land will remain open to those uses during the period of segregation. 
By the time that the actual initial classification is made, commencing 
the running of the period for appeal to the Secretary, the uses 
initiated during the segregative period may have become so en-
trenched that even if the Secretary would have been inclined to 
classify the land for a more restricted use, such as recreation or 
wilderness, the land may no longer be attractive for that use. More-
over, to the extent that the Secretary is confined by his classification 
criteria-which include consideration of existing uses--the range 
137. 43 u.s.c. § 1414 (1964). 
138. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.l-2(e), 2411.2(e) (1969). 
139. See 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(c) (1969) (large-tract disposals); 43 C.F.R. § 2411.2(c) 
(1969) (retentions). 
140. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2411.l-2(e)(2)(iv), 2411.2(e)(2)(iv) (1969). 
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within which he can practically exercise his supervisory authority 
is narrowed further. 
Conservationists might be expected to view with distaste the 
potential abuses inherent in the segregation process. Their rancor 
may be multiplied when they discover that there is no equivalent 
discretion when the proposed classification favors a more restricted 
use of the sort likely to be attractive to the conservationists. At least 
in the case of large-tract disposals, notice of a proposed classification 
cannot alter the availability of the lands under applicable laws for 
leasing, licensing, or permitting, or for disposal of the mineral and 
vegetable resources of the lands.141 Disposition under the mining 
laws may be precluded by the proposal;142 but that restriction pro-
vides little comfort to the conservationist for whom a large gravel 
pit not subject to the restrictions of the mining laws may be fully as 
unattractive as an iron mine, and for whom there would not be even 
the redeeming consideration that nationally important mineral re-
sources were being developed. 
Although those involved in a frenetic quest for an antiestablish-
ment cause may be inclined to view the situation as an exploitationist 
conspiracy, the more reasonable explanation for the approach of the 
regulations is that it is a recognition of the fact that use of the 
public lands is an integral part of many local economies in western 
states, and that consequently prohibition of traditional rights and 
uses of the public lands merely upon the proposal of a local officer 
could be severely disruptive of those economies. The situation does 
not suggest a search for an enemy, but rather points out the need for 
better administrative procedures to aid in ensuring that the initial 
decisions of local officers are in fact subject to executive direction, 
rather than the reverse, as seems presently to be the case. A further 
inquiry might reasonably be made into the manner in which the 
departmental rules and regulations-together with their shortcom-
ings-are adopted. Although a detailed examination of that process 
is beyond the scope of this Comment, it should be noted that there 
appears to be substantial dissatisfaction with the failure of public-
lands agencies to give adequate consideration to public participation 
in the rule-making process.143 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Because of the problems likely to be encountered by individuals 
who deal with the public-lands administrators of the Department of 
141. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-2(e)(l) (1969). 
142. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.l-3(e)(l) (1969). 
143. See, e.g., Carver &: Landstrom, Rule-Making as a Means of Exercising Secre-
tarial Discretion in Public Lands Actions, 8 .ARlz. L. REv. 46 (1966); McCarty, supra 
note 10, at 170-72; cf. C. REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS 13 (1962). Cf. Bonfield, 
Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, 
Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970). 
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the Interior, it might seem particularly appealing to resort to judicial 
review of administrative decisions which are considered unsatisfac-
tory. However, the obstacles to judicial review in this area are 
manifold. An initial problem is that of standing. Since most ad-
judications of the Department of the Interior concern the granting 
or withholding of a license, permit, or sale, there may be no in-
dividual legal right upon which to predicate a lawsuit, if what is 
sought is deemed to be a "Government gratuity."144 Further dif-
ficulties are posed by the bar of sovereign immunity and by the fact 
that many determinations appealed from are likely to have been 
committed to agency discretion by statute. Other problems concern 
jurisdiction for review and the type of proceeding by which judicial 
review should be sought. In addition, there may be problems relat-
ing to the proper parties to the case; thus in a dispute which is 
essentially between private parties, if the Government must be 
joined as an indispensable party, sovereign immunity or a quirk in 
the venue law may vitiate the case. Another problem is how to deter-
mine whether administrative remedies have been exhausted; indeed, 
in light of the frequent obscurity of departmental regulations gov-
erning administrative appeals, that determination may be exceed-
ingly difficult. A related question is whether the issue is ripe for 
review. That problem can be particularly troublesome if appeal is 
sought from a classification decision, for in that case it must be 
determined whether classification may be considered a final decision 
by the agency and whether the injury complained of is proximate 
enough to warrant judicial intervention. If the foregoing problems 
do not as a general matter bar judicial review, then there arises the 
question of the scope of review: may a court depend upon a factual 
record developed in non-AP A administrative proceedings, or must 
the court hold a proceeding de novo, or is a middle approach, such 
as remand, available to the court? Questions such as these confront 
the person who seeks judicial review of decisions of the Department 
of the Interior. 
A. Types of Review 
With the exception of tort claims falling under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 145 and monetary claims falling under the Tucker146 or 
Court of Claims Acts,147 the judiciary has considered actions of the 
Department of the Interior primarily through operation of non-
statutory review and, to a much lesser extent, by specific statutory 
144. See, e.g., Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1963). 
145. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1964). 
146. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a),(b),(d) (1964). 
147. 10 Stat. 612 (1855), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). 
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authorization either for judicial review or for original court pro-
ceedings. 
Original court proceedings are required for the initial deter-
minations in certain mineral cases, including those involving con-
flicting claims for possession in applications for a mineral patent,148 
and certain actions for cancellation of oil leases149 and of pipeline 
rights of way.150 In addition, in a few instances there is direct stat-
utory provision for judicial review of administrative determina-
tions.151 But in all other cases, review, if any, must be nonstatutory 
-that is, based either upon the general review provisions of the 
AP A,152 or upon some other general federal statutory provision, such 
as that governing mandamus.153 Nearly all actions seeking review of 
administrative decisions of the Department of the Interior are non-
statutory in nature;154 accordingly, emphasis will be given here to 
the procedures and problems involved in that type of review. 
B. N onstatutory Review 
I. Basis for Review: Standing and Legal Right 
In general, a plaintiff seeking judicial review of agency action 
must demonstrate that he has suffered harm from the agency's action 
and that such action has violated a legally protected right.155 Strictly 
speaking, the "standing" question is concerned only with whether 
the plaintiff has suffered harm sufficient to place him in an adversary 
position with the defendant,156 and the issue of whether a legally 
protected right has been invaded goes to the question of review-
ability rather than to that of standing.157 Frequently, however, these 
148. 30 u.s.c. § 30 (1964). 
149. 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1964); 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964); 43 C.F.R. § 3386.2 (1969) (off-
shore drilling). 
150. 30 u.s.c. § 185 (1964). 
151. See, e.g., statutory limitation on actions contesting departmental adjudications 
of statutory rights respecting oil and gas leases, 30 U.S.C. § 226·2 (1964), and judicial-
review provisions concerning cancellation of leases under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1335(d) (1964); cf. the statutory-review provision under Federal Power 
Commission Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825(2) (1964). 
152. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
153. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964). 
154. See McFARLAND 184. 
155. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 501 (1965) [hereinafter 
JAFFE]. 
156. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 
U.S.L.W. 4193, 4199 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion). 
157. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 
4193, 4199 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion). The APA conditions the right to 
review upon the existence of a legal wrong: "A person suffering legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." APA § lO(a), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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two questions are joined together under the rubric of "standing."1158 
Thus it has been stated that standing does not exist "unless the right 
invaded is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, 
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute 
which confers a privilege."1150 
In the cases involving regulatory agencies whose activities may 
impinge upon an individual's property rights or othe.r common-law 
rights, the existence of a legal right upon which to base a suit may 
be found outside any statutory grant.169 However, in the case of 
decisions by the Department of the Interior concerning the public 
lands, the existence of a legal right is dependent entirely upon stat-
utory authorization, for the power of Congress over the public 
domain has been described as "plenary" such that persons have 
only those rights to public lands as have been granted by Congress.161 
Such rights may be found, for instance, in statutes creating rights 
to homestead patents162 or mining patents163 upon compliance with 
specified criteria, or may he found in statutes creating preference 
rights to grazing permits,164 sales,1615 or dispositions following classi-
fication.166 In addition to those legal rights granted by statute, rights 
may he created by departmental regulations, an example of which 
is the preference accorded the initial applicant in petition classifica-
tions.167 But it is not necessary for the existence of standing that the 
right be one the interference with which is legally compensable. 
For example, although the Taylor Grazing Act creates no "right, 
title, interest, or estate in or to the lands,"168 and although permits 
issued under that Act may be withdrawn without compensation,169 
the decision to grant or withdraw must be consistent with statute 
and regulation; if it is not, the aggrieved party has standing to chal-
lenge the administrative action.179 
158. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 
U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 
(1939). 
159. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TV A, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (dictum). 
160. See generally Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Doehla Greeting 
Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1953). 
161. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Hamel v. Nelson, 
226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963). 
162. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15, 161, 164, 251-56, 271-84, 321, 329 (1964). 
163. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 15 (1964); 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1964). 
164. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1964) (order of preference for grazing permits). 
165. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1432 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
166. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-4 (1969). 
167. 43 C.F.R. § 2411.1-4 (1969). Concerning the binding effect of regulations gen-
erally, see Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). 
168. 43 u.s.c. § 315(b) (1964). 
169. Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1968). 
170. See, e.g., LaRue v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 
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Courts are generally quite liberal in construing statutes to find 
the existence of a legal right sufficient to afford a plantiff standing 
and the right to seek review. Thus it is said that there is a judicial 
tendency to expand the class of aggrieved persons entitled to seek 
review under the APA171 and that review will not be precluded 
"unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."172 
Occasionally the requisite standing and legal right may be in-
ferred from general policy expressions of Congress. For example, 
congressional statements favoring the consideration of conservation 
interests in particular federal projects have been held to create en-
forceable rights on the part of persons purporting to represent such 
interests; but frequently such findings of standing have been made 
in the context of statutes containing explicit provisions for judicial 
review.173 It is another question whether general policy statements 
may be so used in the context of the public-lands decisions of the 
Department of the Interior, for there the review sought is non-
statutory and the statement of general policy, if any, must be found 
in some statute other than that which grants judicial review. In the 
public-lands context, then, courts may still find persuasive the tra-
ditional requirement that a plaintiff's claim must be a personal one 
in order for him to have standing to challenge the administrative 
action in a judicial proceeding. Dictum in a recent Supreme Court 
case indicates that this distinction may not be material, 174 but the 
question must be regarded as, at best, unsettled. 
2. Sovereign Immunity 
The existence of standing and a legal right does not ensure the 
availability of judicial review. Another potential obstacle to judicial 
907 (1964) (suit by permittee under Taylor Grazing Act entertained, even though 
statute provides that he acquires "no right, title, interest, or estate in or to the 
lands''); McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (plaintiff permitted to claim 
preferential right to a permit under Taylor Grazing Act); Oman v. United States, 179 
F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949) (same); Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308 (D.C. 
Cir. 1938) (suit by an "interim permittee" under the Taylor Grazing Act permitted). 
See also Chapman v. Sheriday-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950), in which the 
Supreme Court found "no need" to discuss the question of standing in a suit by a 
coal-mining lessee to enjoin the Secretary from issuing a similar lease on adjacent 
property in alleged violation of a regulation. 
171. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 
4193, 4194 (U.S. March 3, 1970). See also Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 
(1968); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). 
172. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 
4193, 4195 (U.S. March 3, 1970). 
173. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), afjd., No. 34,010 (2d Cir. April 16, 1970), 297 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(permanent injunction), affd., No. 33,371 (2d Cir., March 19, 1969); Udall v. FPC, 387 
U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 
1965). 
174. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 
4193, 4194 (U.S. March 3, 1970). 
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review of public-land disputes is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
under which one cannot sue the sovereign without its consent. Since 
in nonstatutory review specific consent is almost by definition lack-
ing, creativity and gamesmanship may be required to avoid the 
vague contours of that doctrine and to entice the judiciary into 
considering the merits of a case. Reams of comment critical of the 
doctrine have been written;175 but until there is statutory change, 
the sovereign remains immune. Hence, for the present at least, the 
game must continue to be played. 
An examination of the doctrine must begin with Larson v. 
Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corporation,176 the case which 
provides the "modern keystone of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine."177 In that case, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the 
War Assets Administrator from selling to a third party surplus coal 
claimed by the plaintiff under a contract. In denying relief on the 
ground of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court in a divided 
opinion held that even though an official's action may have been in 
error, relief is still barred by sovereign immunity if the act is in the 
area of the general authority of the official.178 If it could be said 
with assurance that Congress, in delegating administrative power, 
had intended to authorize officials to commit error or wrongful 
acts so long as those acts are within the general sphere of the of-
ficial's authority, Larson's holding in this regard would be less 
troublesome. But presumably Congress does not intend to grant such 
sweeping delegations except when it expressly commits a broad area 
of authority to agency discretion. The Larson approach seems to 
result in a blurring of the distinction between limited delegations 
of administrative authority and the more general commissions of 
authority to agency discretion. Thus, under the Larson approach, 
if a court in its initial perusal of a relevant statute finds an indication 
that the official's action was within his general authority, the inquiry 
stops there, and no real attempt is made to ascertain whether the 
statute was actually intended so to commit the action to agency 
discretion.17° The Larson version of sovereign immunity interlocks 
with an exception to review that is contained in the AP A to form a 
broad front that denies judicial consideration of the merits of con-
troversies. Most nonstatutory review is sought under section IO of 
175. See, e.g., Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: 
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1479 (1962) 
[hereinafter Byse]; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: 
The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387 (1970) [hereinafter Cramton]. 
176. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). 
177. Cramton 406. 
178, 337 U.S. at 695. 
179. Cramton 406-08; Byse 1490-91. 
1224 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:1200 
the AP A,180 which specifically precludes review of actions "com-
mitted to agency discretion."181 A finding under that section that a 
given act is committed to agency discretion would have an effect 
similar to that of invoking sovereign immunity, for if the official's 
act is discretionary, it is difficult to show the departure from legal 
authority that is necessary to avoid sovereign immunity. It might be 
thought that one reason why Congress excluded discretionary acts 
from review was a reluctance to disturb the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity as it existed at the time the AP A was enacted. But the 
subsequent Larson decision fundamentally altered the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. That decision has had the effect of permitting 
courts to bypass the need for any real examination of whether a 
function is truly committed by statute to agency discretion, with 
the result that in many instances, the black-letter "presumption of 
reviewability"182 may be rendered an empty maxim supplanted by 
the Larson fiction. Even though courts have sometimes held that 
the AP A itself constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity in cases 
to which that Act applies, 183 a general application of the Larson 
version of sovereign immunity may instead prevent the AP A from 
applying. The circularity is distressing, but is representative of the 
confusion which surrounds the question of sovereign immunity.184 
Other aspects of Larson complicate the subject further. Under 
that decision, the test of whether sovereign immunity is a bar turns 
on the rubric of whether the suit is "in effect a suit against the 
sovereign" which would leave the "government ... stopped in its 
tracks."185 But it is a fiction to assert that suits against federal of-
ficers are not in effect against the Government, for it is clear that in 
most cases it is the Government, not its employee, against whom the 
complaint is directed.186 That the Government should not be 
stopped in its tracks is not generally disputed, but cases in this area 
demonstrate that the rhetoric does not furnish the courts with an 
adequate guide.187 
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Types of review proceedings are dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 196-230 infra. 
181. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
182. JAFFE 336-53. 
183. See, e.g., Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1969); Adams v. Witmer, 
271 F.2d 29, 34 (9th Cir. 1958). But see Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1952). 
184. The Supreme Court has recognized that even prior to Larson the law of 
sovereign immunity was an area of great confusion. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 
646 (1962). It seems doubtful that Larson and later cases have alleviated that con• 
fusion. See Cramton 424. 
185. 337 U.S. at 687, 704. 
186. Cramton 399, 410-11. 
187. Despite the admonition, it is clear that many cases do in fact stop the Govern-
ment in its tracks if the underlying dispute appears important enough to the court. 
See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (method of withdrawing security 
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Sovereign immunity according to Larson erects other barriers 
to judicial review. If escape from the doctrine is sought in the tradi-
tional manner of casting the suit against the officer rather than 
against the Government, application of immunity may depend upon 
an examination of the hypothetical question of whether there would 
be vicarious liability if the officer were a private agent and the Gov-
ernment a private principal. If a private principal would be liable, 
the suit must fail, for it is then in essence against the sovereign.188 
Aside from the dubious relevance of agency law to judicial review 
of administrative actions, 189 this test produces some perplexing ques-
tions of application. If a governmental official's vulnerability to suit 
turns on his "authority," how is that authority to be ascertained? 
In private agency cases, an agent may acquire authority by oral 
direction, by the principal's acquiescence, or by mere appearance.190 
But the pertinent inquiry in review of administrative action should 
be whether the act in question was authorized by law. When ap-
plied to cases involving public-lands agencies of the Department of 
the Interior, the problem is further complicated by the question of 
how to treat the unpublished internal regulations of the agency. If 
an act is authorized for private agency purposes by such internal di-
rection, presumably the action must then be characterized as one 
against the sovereign, whether or not the "authorization" was con-
sistent with statute or published regulation. Moreover, if the act 
complained of falls within the agency's general area of authority, it 
seems clear from Larson that the suit must fail, and the central 
question of whether the act was wrongful is not even considered. 
Another aspect of sovereign immunity which may pose particular 
problems for judicial review of actions of public-lands agencies is 
the Larson court's cryptic footnote indicating that a suit "may" fail 
if the relief sought would require affirmative action by the sover-
eign.191 Application of that footnote can mean that even when a 
governmental official unlawfully seizes a plaintiff's land, the plain-
tiff cannot obtain specific relief, but is limited to a damage remedy, 
notwithstanding traditions of equity respecting the inadequacy of 
damages in lands cases.192 
clearance). Yet the rhetoric remains to trap those who are less sophisticated in the 
tactics of evasion. See generally Cramton 420·23. 
188. 337 U.S. 682, 692-95 (1949); accord, Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclama-
tion Dist. No. 1 v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425, 432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 
(1954). 
189. See Cramton 409. 
190. See, e.g., Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1960). 
191. 337 U.S. at 691 n.11. 
192. See, e.g., Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 
(1968); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 
(1965). 
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Against the backdrop of sovereign immunity there is lent some 
hope to litigants-and more confusion to everyone-by the long-
standing tradition of limited judicial review in public-lands cases.193 
Prior to Larson, sovereign immunity was a bar in only a limited 
range of lands cases;194 and even in the wake of Larson, the Supreme 
Court has not invoked the doctrine in any lands case which involved 
review of administrative decisions.195 Although sovereign immunity 
has been applied by the Court in cases in which some lands interests 
of the United States have been involved, notably Malone v. Bow-
doin196 and Dugan v. Rank,197 those cases, it has been suggested, can-
not properly be characterized as public-lands cases because they did not 
arise out of administrative determinations of lands agency officials.198 
In cases involving review of administrative decisions concerning the 
public lands, the Court has failed to invoke the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity, even though the lands interests of the United States 
may have been directly affected. In Udall v. Talman,199 for example, 
the plaintiff alleged that the Secretary of the Interior had wrong-
fully refused to issue to the plaintiff oil and gas leases for certain 
federal lands; and the Court denied mandamus relief, not on the 
fundamental ground of sovereign immunity, but instead on the 
basis of a thorough interpretation of the applicable statute. 
But despite the argument that public-lands cases such as Talman 
comprise an existential category of cases to which the sovereign im-
munity doctrine does not apply,200 that characterization has not 
been explicitly recognized by the courts. Indeed, since Larson, lower 
courts have applied the sovereign immunity doctrine in public-
lands cases, albeit sporadically.201 The resulting confusion that sur-
193. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). See generally Peck, Judicial 
Review of Administrative Actions of the Bureau of Land Management and Secretary 
of the Interior, 9 ROCKY l\fT. MINERAL L. REv. 225, 252 (1964); Scalia, Sovereign Im-
munity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions 
from the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970) (hereinafter Scalia]. 
194. The doctrine was applied in cases in which states sought to invoke the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [e.g., Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 
(1906)], and in cases instituted by Indians challenging the administration of tribal 
lands held in trust by the United States [e.g., Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 473 
(1906)). • 
195. Apparently Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925), was the last occasion on 
which the Supreme Court invoked the sovereign immunity doctrine to defeat review 
of an administrative decision of a land agency. Scalia 903. 
196. 369 U.S. 643 (1962) (Court held that suit to eject Forest Service officer from 
plaintiff's land was barred by sovereign immunity.). 
197. 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (Court held that suit by downstream landowner to enjoin 
Bureau of Reclamation from impounding water was barred by sovereign immunity). 
198. Scalia 909-12. 
199. 380 U.S. I (1965). 
200. Scalia 882-909. 
201. Compare Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 
(1968) (suit to quiet title to accreted land held to be barred), Ward v. Humble 
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rounds the entire question of sovereign immunity is such that 
litigants in this area cannot with certainty rely upon any line of 
precedent. As a practical matter, whether sovereign immunity will 
bar relief may depend upon whether the Government includes the 
doctrine in a shotgun defense, upon the skill of plaintiff's counsel in 
evading the doctrine, and upon the sophistication of the court.202 
In all cases, however, the doctrine remains a potential hazard for 
litigants, one of a plethora of problems facing those who seek to 
challenge administrative action. 
The time-honored device for evading sovereign immunity is the 
officer's suit, in which the aggrieved party casts his suit against the 
administrative officer responsible for the injury or violation, rather 
than against the Government itself. In the past the necessity of so 
phrasing the complaint caused many problems when the plaintiff 
made the error of suing the ·wrong officer or describing the defen-
dant by his official title rather than by name.203 Further problems 
arose if the named defendant's term of office expired in the course 
of the proceedings. In addition, for many years, actions for man-
damus or in the nature of mandamus could be brought only in the 
District of Columbia, whose courts, by virtue of having inherited 
the equity and common-law powers of the courts of Maryland, pos-
sessed powers not held by other federal courts.204 Recent years, how-
ever, have seen the elimination of many of these barriers. The 
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962205 permits mandamus actions to 
be brought against federal officers in any federal district court; and 
the liberal amendment and service-of-process provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 206 together with provisions for naming 
the defendant in his official capacity and for the substitution of sue-
Oil &: Ref. Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963), and Seifert v. Udall, 280 F. Supp. 443 
(D. Mont. 1968), with Zager v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Wis. 1966) (title 
action stemming from resurvey of land ordered by Secretary of the Interior, held to 
be not barred), and Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), 
vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955). See also Brown v. Udall, 325 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 
1964) (declaratory judgment holding invalid Secretary's rejection of mineral lease ap-
plication); Foster v. Udall, 335 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1964); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 
29 (9th Cir. 1958) (enjoined cancellation of grant of mining claim; reversed lower 
court's holding that sovereign immunity barred relief); McKay v. Whalenmaier, 226 
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (mandamus issued ordering substitution of one oil and gas 
lease for another). 
202. See generally Cramton 420-21. 
203. See, e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969); cf. Bell v. 
Groak, 371 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1966); CORE v. Commissioner, 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 
1967). 
204. The explanation for this power of the District's courts is that the District was 
carved from the state of Maryland. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
205. 28 u.s.c. § 1391 (1964). 
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 15. 
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cessors in office,207 have helped a great deal.208 Fortunately for liti-
gants in public-lands cases, statutes of limitation have seldom been 
a problem because when review is nonstatutory, there usually is 
no applicable statute of limitations;209 and the only time-bar defense, 
other than the court's discretionary power to dismiss for delay, is 
that of equitable laches.210 
Most cases for nonstatutory review in this area are brought 
under the AP A. In those proceedings, the plaintiff sues the federal 
officer, claiming that his statutory rights or privileges have been il-
legally denied by the officer. The relief sought is either an injunc-
tion or a declaratory judgment.211 But since sovereign immunity 
may prevent the granting of affirmative relief,212 it may be advisable 
that plaintiff's prayer for relief be phrased in negative terms. 
Whether a court will countenance granting affirmative relief in a 
negative guise is another area of uncertainty upon which the litigant 
must gamble. 
In light of that uncertainty, the plaintiff might prefer to seek 
affirmative relief by mandamus rather than through an injunction 
or a declaratory judgment.213 It appears, however, that the scope of 
relief available in an action for mandamus is narrower than it is in 
the other types of actions, since, under traditional formulations, only 
a "ministerial" act may be compelled, not acts involving some dis-
cretion.214 Moreover, actions in the nature of mandamus may not 
be available when the federal officer has interfered with the plain-
tiff's rights, unless it also can be shown that the officer "owed a 
duty" to the plaintiff.215 In contrast, injunctive or declaratory relief 
may be available even if the act sought or complained of involves 
207. FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d)(l), (2). 
208. Prior to 1966, it was possible that the time delay involved in amending a 
complaint might operate to defeat an action, but the possibility of such a dismissal 
has been reduced by the change in 1966 of rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, permitting amendments in pleadings to relate back to the date of the 
original pleading. The liberal amendment provisions, however, have eliminated only 
the consequences of suing the wrong officer; they have not entirely done away with 
the problem of determining which officer to sue. 
209. An exception to this generalization is found in the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 
U.S.C. § 226-2 (1964), which requires that any action for judicial review must be com-
menced within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 
210. See .Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 807-08 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
975 (1967). 
211. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1964). 
212. See text accompanying note 191 supra. 
213. One important advantage of a mandamus action brought under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1361 (1964) is that the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the case meets the 
$10,000 jurisdictional amount of 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964). 
214. See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 
1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. 
L. REv. 308 (1967). 
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964); .Byse & Fiocca, supra note 214. 
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some discretion, for under the AP A only those acts committed to 
agency discretion are unreviewable.216 As has been seen, however, 
that distinction may not get a chance to operate if sovereign im-
munity is triggered simply on a showing of "general" authority.217 
Another way in which a litigant may avoid the bar of sovereign 
immunity is by persuading the Government to initiate the suit. If 
the administrative determination is one which requires the claimant 
to take some action such as surrendering possession, he can simply 
refuse and wait to defend himself on the merits in a suit initiated 
by the Govemment.218 That course of action, however, may require 
expenditures of time and money in maintaining the property-a 
problem particularly troublesome if the law under which the indi-
vidual is claiming the land requires development or construction 
as a condition to the claim. Moreover, a litigant selecting this course 
of action runs the risk that he may subject himself to civil liabilities 
if the land has been awarded to another claimant, who initiates 
suit.210 
A third course of action sometimes available to a disappointed 
claimant is to sue the party to whom the land has been awarded. 
That practice is employed fairly frequently, and the issues may 
sometimes be decided in state courts.220 However, it seems that a 
usual prerequisite to such a proceeding is the issuance of a patent 
by the Govemment;221 and a claimant who waits that long to ini-
tiate suit runs the risk that the patentee will defeat the claim by 
transfering the land to a bona fide purchaser.222 Moreover, if the 
decision upon which the complainant bases his claim does not call 
for the issuance of a patent, the action will never ripen for this type 
of review.223 
216. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). For a general discussion of this distinc-
tion, see Sperling &: Cooney, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Under 
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 1 LAND &: WATER L. REv. 433, 434-38 (1966). 
217. See text accompanying note 178 supra. 
218. That right is explicitly recognized in section IO(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 703 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968): "Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive op-
portunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial 
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement." But recognition of 
that right predates the APA. See, e.g., United States v. Detroit Timber &: Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 338 (1906). 
219. See generally McFARLAND 188. 
220. See, e.g., Crowder v. Lyle, 225 Cal. App. 2d 439, 37 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1964). But 
if the action involves a federal officer and seeks specific relief or is based solely on 
federal law, a state forum probably will not be able to grant relief. See generally 
Arnold, The Power of State Courts To Enjoin Federal Officials, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 
(1964). 
221. See, e.g., Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U.S. 473 (1899); cf. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. 
Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). See generally McFARLAND 186-87. 
222. See McFARLAND 186. 
223. See generally McFARLAND 188 &: n.269. 
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In those situations in which a claimant seeks to sue the party 
to whom the land has been awarded, but cannot bring the action in 
a state court because the patent has not been issued, 224 the claimant 
may find that relief in the federal courts-at least in the federal 
district court-is also unavailable. Prior to the passage of the Man-
damus and Venue Act in 1962, governmental officers could be sued 
in the district courts only if they could be reached for service of 
process. If it was determined that a superior officer was an indis-
pensable party, 225 and if a plaintiff could not effect service of process 
upon that officer, it was necessary for him to bring his suit in the 
District of Columbia where that superior officer could be served. 
The Mandamus and Venue Act lessened this problem by providing 
for nationwide service of process upon the necessary federal of-
ficers.226 But the liberalized service and venue provisions are avail-
able only when each defendant is an officer or employee of the 
United States.227 Hence, if the nature of a suit is such that it is 
necessary to join as defendants both federal officers and persons who 
are not federal officers, a plaintiff probably will be unable to bring 
his suit in the district court unless all federal officers who are indis-
pensable parties can be served with process without aid of the lib-
eralized provision.228 A major problem in this connection is to 
determine who is an indispensable party. The traditional rubric 
for determining when a superior officer is an indispensable party is 
whether "the decree granting the relief sought will require [the 
official] to take action, either by exercising directly a power lodged 
in him, or by having a subordinate exercise it for him."220 In light 
of the vagaries and obfuscations which are likely to be encountered 
in an attempt to unravel the lines of authority in the administrative 
structure of the Department of the Interior, it seems that most plain-
tiffs faced with the predicament would be best advised simply to 
forego suit in the district court and seek relief by other means.230 
224. See notes 220-21 supra. 
225. For the traditional test for determining whether a party is indispensable, see 
text accompanying note 229 infra. 
226. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964). 
227. 28 U.S.C. § 139l(e) (1964). 
228. See generally McFARLAND 189, 305; Cramton 463-65. 
229. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947). 
230. See generally McFARLAND 263-88; Sperling &: Cooney, supra note 216, at 4!H 
nn.24-25. There is some case precedent which can serve as a guide to when the 
Secretary is an indispensable party. Compare Thomas v. Union P. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 
588 (D. Colo.), affd. per curiam, 239 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1956) (Secretary indispensable 
in action to compel issuance of patent), and Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 
U.S. 28 (1897) (Secretary indispensable in action to compel issuance of lease), with 
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 
366 U.S. 936 (1961) (Secretary not indispensable in action to enjoin cancellation of 
lease). 
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3. Jurisdictional Problems 
Another obstacle to the claimant, contestant, or protestant who 
seeks review of an administrative decision respecting public lands 
is the requirement that he show that the amount in controversy is 
sufficient to obtain federal-question jurisdiction under section 1331 
(a) of title 28 of the United States Code.231 In public-lands cases, 
that amount is determined by reference not to the value of the land 
itself, but to the value of the plaintiff's interest which is the subject 
of the controversy. Such value, however, may be difficult to deter-
mine in cases involving, for example, the value of a cloud on the 
title232 or the value of the enjoyment of recreation or wilderness. 
Even if a plaintiff is able to determine the value of the interest in 
controversy, in many public-lands cases that amount is less than 
the requisite 10,000 dollars, as, for example, in a suit challenging a 
grant of grazing rights233 or in a suit challenging an allegedly wrong-
ful enforcement of grazing regulations.234 A plaintiff may be able to 
escape the problem simply by asserting that he meets the jurisdic-
tional requirements,235 but he should not place too much reliance 
upon the possibility that the court will accept his assertion at face 
value.236 
A plaintiff might also evade the jurisdictional-amount require-
ment by bringing suit in the District of Columbia and thus taking 
advantage of the inherited equity power of that jurisdiction, which 
may be exercised without regard to the amount in controversy.237 
But that device has its own built-in cost limitation because if the 
amount in controversy does not satisfy the requirements for federal-
question jurisdiction, it is unlikely to be economically feasible for 
the plaintiff, who may be a Montanan sheep grazer or an Alaskan 
homesteader, to bring suit in the District of Columbia. 
An alternative method for avoiding jurisdictional-amount prob-
231. 28 U.S.C. § 133l(a) (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or 
value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States." 
232. See, e.g., Cameron v. United States, 146 U.S. 533 (1892) Ourisdictional amount 
must be determined not by value of land itself, but by value of color of title to 
property). 
233. Helvy v. Webb, 36 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (value of grazing rights). 
234. Gavica v. Donaugh, 93 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1937) (enforcement of grazing 
regulations). 
235. Cf. Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (selective-service 
classification). But see Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.J. 1968). 
236. See notes 232-34 supra; 28 U.S.C. § 133l(b) (1964) (assessment of costs on 
plaintiff if judgment does not meet requirements for jurisdictional amount); cf. Car-
roll v. Sommerville, II6 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1941). See generally Cramton 437-41. 
237. See text accompanying note 204 supra; Cramton 442-43; cf. R.H. Macy Co. v. 
Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1965). 
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!ems is for the plaintiff to base jurisdiction on some ground other 
than federal-question jurisdiction. One possibility is the Declaratory 
Judgment Act,238 but the language of that statute does not seem to 
furnish an independent basis of jurisdiction.239 An independent 
basis of jurisdiction is available under the Mandamus and Venue 
Act,240 but that basis is effective only if the plaintiff can fit his case 
within the technicalities and limitations of the mandamus remedy.241 
A final possibility for evading the jurisdictional-amount limitation 
is to predicate jurisdiction on section 10 of the AP A. Unlike the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, that statute does not expressly limit it-
self to situations otherwise within the court's jurisdiction; instead, 
it makes reference only to "a court of competent jurisdiction,"242 a 
common bit of statutory boilerplate which seems to beg the ques-
tion. But although some cases have held that section 10 does provide 
an independent source of jurisdiction,243 the weight of authority is 
to the contrary.244 Nevertheless, it seems that a narrow construction 
of section 10 is not consistent with what is arguably the spirit of the 
AP A. That Act aims to expand the availability of review of admin-
istrative actions, whereas a narrow construction of section 10 tends 
to restrict review by permitting it only to the extent that (1) other 
statutes provide jurisdiction, (2) other statutes do not preclude judi-
cial review,245 and (3) the agency action is not one committed by 
law to agency discretion.246 
238. 28 u.s.c. § 2201 (1964). 
239. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) (emphasis added) provides that "any court of the 
United States .•• may declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration" but apparently only "[i]n a case of actual controversy 
within its jurisdiction." Occasionally, however, courts seem to view the Declaratory 
Judgment Act as providing an independent source of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Henrikson 
v. Udall, 229 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Cal. 1964), afjd., 350 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 940 (1966) (mining claim); Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 
1965) (tobacco marketing quotas). See generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 329. 
240. 28 u.s.c. § 1361 (1964). 
241. See text accompanying notes 214-17 supra and text accompanying notes 311-14 
infra. See also Cramton 443. 
242. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
243. Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); 
Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d 
555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (validity of mining claim); 
Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958); cf. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 
(2d Cir. 1966); McEachem v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963); Estrada v. 
Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 
330-31; Scalia 920-24. 
244. Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 
529 (8th Cir. 1967) (validity of tribal election); Choumos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 
(10th Cir. 1964) (validity of mining claim); cf. Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. 
Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960); Kansas City Power &: 
Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). See 
generally Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 330-31; Scalia 920-24. 
245. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
246. 5 U.S.C. § 70I(a)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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4. Ripeness and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Assuming that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Depart-
ment of the Interior can demonstrate the existence of a legal right 
upon which to base standing, can avoid sovereign immunity, and 
can satisfy jurisdictional requirements, judicial review on the merits 
is still not available unless the controversy is "ripe" for review and 
the aggrieved person has exhausted his administrative remedies.247 
The concept of "ripeness" may include various factors, including 
whether there is a justiciable controversy, whether there is standing, 
whether administrative remedies have been exhausted, and whether 
the injury complained of is imminent enough to warrant judicial 
intervention.248 The concept is vague at best, and its application to 
public-lands disputes appears uncertain. Most of the cases on the 
subject seem to turn on the question of whether there is a justiciable 
case or controversy;249 but it has been suggested that those cases, 
decided in a constitutional context, can be explained by the Su-
preme Court's reluctance to decide questions of constitutional sig-
nificance until truly necessary.250 So viewed, such cases do not fur-
nish an adequate guide as to when administrative actions not 
involving constitutional issues should be reviewable.251 
It has been further suggested that the judicial insistence that 
there be a matured controversy between adverse parties may be mis-
placed when applied in the administrative context. With regard to 
federal regulatory activities, such judicial reluctance may perpetuate 
harmful uncertainty among those regulated;252 likewise, in the pub-
lic-lands area, doubt concerning the legal validity of a regulation or 
a classification may create uncertainty among those who seek to use 
or develop the land. For example, an arguably invalid classification 
decision to withdraw lands from availability for mineral develop-
ment may create uncertainty among potential developers; yet if a 
strict approach to ripeness is applied, there can be no review of the 
proposed classification unless and until someone has been willing 
to go through a tedious, lengthy, perhaps expensive, and probably 
futile application process253 in order to create an issue "ripe" for 
review. In other areas, "ripeness" has sometimes been found at an 
early stage in the administrative proceedings, as it has in general 
247. See generally JAFFE 424. 
248. JAFFE 395-98. 
249. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942). 
See generally JAFFE 395. 
250. JAFFE 397. 
251. Id. There is some suggestion that "justiciability" in the constitutional context 
is an entirely different term of art from "justiciability" in the context of judicial re-
view. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W. 
4193, 4199 n.3 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (dissenting opinion). 
252. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 21.01 (1958) [hereinafter DAVIS]. 
253. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
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designations of organizations as Communist;254 but classifications 
and adjudications in the public-lands areas seem to lack such im-
mediate impact and appeal to the judiciary. Decisions denying judi-
cial review of public-lands decisions seldom turn upon the ripeness 
issue, probably because there are so many other bases available on 
which to refuse review,255 and perhaps because if a person is suffi-
ciently aggrieved to hazard an assault on the many barriers to judicial 
review, the issue at hand is probably very ripe indeed. Moreover, 
in the few instances in which a decision in this area has turned upon 
the ripeness issue, reliance on that issue appears to have been mis-
placed, with the real objection based on sovereign immunity, a lack 
of standing, or a lack of jurisdiction.256 
Clearly there is a place for the ripeness factor in considering 
whether to grant judicial review of decisions in the public-lands area. 
But it should be a small niche, with invocation of the doctrine oc-
curing only after a thorough balancing of the considerations in-
volved, including, on the one hand, the hardship which could result 
from a denial of judicial relief257 and the possibility that delay might 
result in compounding damages,258 and, on the other hand, the in-
appropriateness and difficulty of judicial disposition at an early 
stage. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies may present a more 
troublesome problem. Under general notions of administrative law, 
a prerequisite to judicial review is the exhaustion of administrative 
· remedies.259 Some exceptions are made, however, when the chal-
lenge is on constitutional grounds260 or is one alleging that the en-
tire administrative rule-making apparatus is illegal.261 Additional 
exceptions may be available when it can be sho-wn that further ad-
ministrative redress would be futile262 or that the decision com-
plained of will cause immediate and irreparable injury.263 
254. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
255. Those bases include the lack of a legal right, lack of standing, lack of juris• 
diction, sovereign immunity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
256. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Conservation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 
1968) (action to enjoin Army Corps of Engineers' reservoir project dismissed for lack 
of ripeness) (alternative holding); cf. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (reser• 
voir); Jasper v. Sawyer, 205 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (airport). 
257. That flexible approach is favored by Jaffe. See JAFFE 423. 
258. Thus if ripeness had been the only reason for denying relief in Delaware 
Conservation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1968), deferring relief until the 
project was completed could have caused both irreparable harm and the compounding 
of whatever damages were threatened. 
259. See generally DAVIS §§ 20.01-.10. 
260. See, e.g., Public Util. Commn. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958). See gen-
erally DAVIS § 20.04; JAFFE 438-40. 
261. See, e.g., Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919). See gen• 
erally JAFFE 426-28. 
262. JAFFE 446-49. 
263. JAFFE 429-32. 
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Whether all available appeal procedures must have been pur-
sued prior to seeking judicial relief is a matter of some doubt. 
Apparently, administrative appeal is necessary unless the initial de-
cision is considered final,264 and "final" decisions seem to be those 
which are immediately operative.265 If a party seeks judicial review 
only to discover that he has failed to exhaust administrative rem-
edies, he may find himself without any forum for review of the 
offending decision, because administrative appeal may have been 
foreclosed by the delay which occurred while judicial review was 
being prematurely sought and because judicial review may be con-
ditioned upon compliance with administrative appeal procedures.266 
The application of the foregoing general rules to public-lands 
decisions of the Department of the Interior is only partly clear. At 
least it is clear that exhaustion of appeal procedures is necessary, 
since initial orders are generally not effective during appeal.267 The 
regulations provide, however, that the officer to whom the appeal is 
taken may in his discretion provide that a decision, or a part of it, 
be immediately effective.268 Whether such orders assume the posture 
of a final decision for purposes of judicial review is not clear; pre-
sumably the answer depends on the effect that the decision will have 
upon the applicant and on whether the applicant can show that ir-
reparable damage will result from the decision. Because failure to 
pursue administrative appeals can result in a denial both of judicial 
relief and of any subsequent administrative recourse, persons deal-
ing with the BLM should adhere closely to the strict provisions and · 
practices concerning the filing deadlines for appeal.269 
In some instances, however, it is less clear how the exhaustion 
requirement applies to a decision of the Department of the Interior. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies presupposes that the plain-
tiff has knowledge of how he is to pursue those remedies. But, as has 
264. Under the APA, only "final" administrative determinations are subject to 
judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
265. See DAVIS § 20.08. 
266. See JAFFE 450. 
267. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-9(a) (1969). 
268. 43 C.F.R. § 1840.0-9(a) (1969). 
269. The provisions for summary dismissal are strictly enforced. See text accom-
panying notes 63-65 supra. Moreover, even if the local official grants an extension for 
filing, the appellant would be well advised to adhere to the letter of the regulations 
and not to rely on any such purported extension. The Bureau's internal regulations 
do not authorize agents to grant extensions of time for appeal, and an appeal in 
reliance on such an extension may still suffer summary dismissal. See Ollie ·w. Brooks, 
66 Interior Dec. 108 (1959). Occasionally courts express dismay with such cavalier 
treatment. See, e.g., Tagula v. Gorsuch, 411 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1969), in which a de-
partmental official had exercised his power of summary dismissal for failure to file an 
appeal memorandum within the required thirty days. The court found that summary 
dismissal was entirely discretionary; but because the appeal had been dismissed out-
right, the court remanded with instructions that before dismissing, considered discre-
tion must be exercised. 
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been indicated, there may be some difficulty in determining both 
the lines of authority within the Department and the means and 
requirements for prosecuting an administrative appeal.270 The prob-
lem may become particularly acute if the rights and interests in 
question are those of a third party. In the first place, it is not clear 
whether a third party will be allowed to participate in an initial 
proceeding: if it is a hearing-type proceeding, he may be accorded 
status as an intervenor; if it is not a hearing proceeding, he may 
merely get a chance to make his position knmvn to the examining 
officer. A third party's status in an administrative appeal is even 
more uncertain: for appeal to the Director, he must be an "ag-
grieved party to the case" who is "adversely affected";271 for appeal 
to the Secretary, he must be only an "aggrieved party ... adversely 
affected."272 If the third party is denied standing for administrative 
appeal, presumably he has exhausted his administrative remedies, 
thus meeting one requirement for judicial review. Assuming that he 
can also meet the standing requirement and the other requirements 
for judicial review, the question that then arises is what the review-
ing court should do. Since the scope of review is generally limited 
to issues and facts raised in administrative proceedings,273 the prob-
able decision of the court-if other than dismissal-would be to 
remand to the agency for further proceedings. Following another 
administrative appeal, the aggrieved party, if still not satisfied, pre-
sumably could again seek judicial review, this time on the merits, 
at least with respect to those issues raised in the administrative pro-
ceedings. 
5. Scope of Review 
Assuming that a claimant, contestant, or protestant is able to 
overcome all obstacles and obtain judicial consideration, he must 
then face the problem of what will be the scope of the review 
granted. In general, that review is sharply limited with respect to 
factual determinations and only slightly less so with respect to legal 
determinations. 
a. APA proceedings. The scope of review in AP A proceedings is 
covered generally by section IO(e) of that Act, under which the 
court is authorized to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed"274 and to "hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, 
capricious, in abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
270. See text accompanying notes 131-35 supra. 
271. See text accompanying note 119 supra. 
272. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
273. See text accompanying notes 274-314 infra. 
274. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right ... ; (C) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory 
rights; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) 
unsupported by substantial evidence [if the case is one in which an 
administrative hearing was required by statute] ... or otherwise re-
viewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject 
to trial de nova by the reviewing court."275 
The foregoing provisions, however, are applicable only to the 
extent that (1) statutes do not preclude review of the agency ac-
tion, 276 or (2) the agency action is not one committed by law to 
agency discretion.277 Because review of decisions made by the De-
partment of the Interior is almost entirely nonstatutory, there is 
seldom a special statute precluding review of such decisions. The 
second exception, however, poses a greater problem; indeed, 
whether a decision is one committed to agency discretion is fre-
quently the central issue in actions for judicial review. The Depart-
ment of the Interior has long argued that its determinations are 
entirely discretionary and that "Congress has delegated to the Secre-
tary the plenary authority to dispose of the public lands as he may 
direct."278 Undeniably the discretion delegated to the Secretary of 
the Interior is immense,279 and courts have occasionally described 
his power over the public lands as "plenary."280 But few courts have 
been willing to view that power as being so extensive that the Secre-
tary is exempt from AP A review; indeed, some courts, particularly 
in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have occasionally sought a liberal 
application of AP A review.281 But even if the agency action in ques-
tion is found to have been one which is not entirely committed to 
agency discretion, with the result that AP A review is available, the 
scope of that review is still limited by judicial deference to agency 
discretion. 
275. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A)-(F) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
276. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(I) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
277. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
278. Brief for Appellee Stewart L. Udall at 34, Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 
190 (9th Cir. 1966), afjd. on rehearing, 379 F.2d 555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 
U.S. 599 (1968), quoted in Parr, Government Initiated Contests Against Mining Claims 
-A Continuing Conflict, 6 RocKY MT. MINERAL L. REv. I, 22 (1968). 
279. A single statute, 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964), is cited by the Department as its 
authority for promulgating a vast number of regulations [see, e.g., 43 C.F.R. pts. 1840, 
1850, 2410 (1969)]. That statute authorized the Secretary, or such officer as he may 
designate, to enforce and carry into execution by appropriate regulations every part 
of the provisions of title 43 for which there is no other specific provision. 
280. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963). 
281. See, e.g., Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 975 (1967); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1958). But cf. Ferry v. 
Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965). See gen• 
erally Parr, supra note 278, at 23. 
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With regard to questions of fact, section 10( e) of the AP A permits 
courts to set aside agency action or findings which are "unsupported 
by substantial evidence"282 if the agency's action was taken after a 
hearing which met the formal requirements of sections 7 and 8 of 
that Act.283 But as has been stated, there are few Department of the 
Interior adjudications in which such hearings are required.284 In 
cases not subject to such hearings, it is not entirely clear what consti-
tutes the factual record for the reviewing court, and section IO(e) is 
silent in that respect.285 The easy answer is simply to hold that if 
no administrative hearing is required, the agency action is one com-
mitted to agency discretion and hence is unreviewable. In practice, 
that approach may often be what is taken, since cases involving a 
legal right created by statute are for the most part those for which 
hearings are provided; and if there is no legal right, there is prob-
ably no standing to seek judicial review. Thus cases involving mere 
refusals to grant applications for sales or permits may be considered 
discretionary dispensations of a "government gratuity" and therefore 
unreviewable.286 
If that Draconian approach is rejected, as it often is,287 the court 
must face the question of what facts it should refer to on review. 
Section IO(e) seems to anticipate trial de novo,288 but at least with 
respect to public-lands disputes, that device seems to be unknown.289 
Instead, the reviewing courts generally tend to restrict themselves 
to the administrative record, however that record may have been 
determined.290 That restriction means that the plaintiff is limited to 
whatever he has been able to accomplish in the administrative pro-
ceedings, in which he may have been at a pronounced disadvantage. 
282. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
283. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
284. See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
285. The "unsupported by substantial evidence" test also applies to a case "other-
wise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute," 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(E) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); but that provision too furnishes little guide, for by 
and large the Department of the Interior does not have "hearings provided by 
statute." See text accompanying notes 145-55 supra. 
286. See, e.g., Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 
(1965) (refusal to sell lands to highest bidder at public auction held to be discretionary; 
no legal rights created in highest bidder); Hamel v. Nelson, 226 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. 
Cal. 1963) (rejection of request for patent). 
287. See note 170 supra. 
288. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) states that a court may set aside an 
agency decision found to be "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts 
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." 
289. See Couch v. Udall, 265 F. Supp. 848 (D. Okla. 1967); Noren v. Beck, 199 F. 
Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1961); cf. Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), 
afjd. on rehearing 379 F.2d 555 (1967), revd. on other grounds, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); 
Duesing v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1965). 
290. See McFARLAND 186. 
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For example, even if a plaintiff had persuaded the officials to grant 
him a discretionary hearing, he would not have had an opportunity 
to submit a brief to the field commissioner or to see the commis-
sioner's proposed finding which in all probability proved dispositive 
of the case.291 Worse yet, if the factual determination was made by 
the more common ex parte method, the applicant would not have 
had the opportunity to confront, or even to hear testimony by, ad-
verse witnesses, 292 nor would he have had the chance to know or 
refute the manner by which factual determinations were made in 
any investigations pending his departmental appeal.293 Yet the fruit 
of such investigations appears in the departmental file, which must 
provide the factual record for judicial review. It thus seems that 
many, if not most, applicants dealing with the Department of the 
Interior are at a severe disadvantage, with respect to factual issues, 
throughout both administrative and judicial proceedings. Still, the 
practice has been approved by at least one reviewing court.294 
The "Freedom of Information Act"295 may help to alleviate some 
of these problems; it at least prevents application of previous de-
cisions endorsing such administrative practices. The judicial posture 
indicated in such decisions, however, exemplifies the deference 
courts generally show to factual determinations by the Department. 
In effect, that deference may be equivalent to holding that the ac-
tion is one committed to agency discretion. The policy of deference 
is a hoary one, traceable at least to Cameron v. United States,296 in 
which the Supreme Court held that factual determinations by the 
Secretary of the Interior were "conclusive in the absence of fraud 
or imposition."297 Although such language may still be troublesome 
291. McCarty, supra note IO, at 176-77. See also text accompanying note 36 supra. 
292. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 1823.2-2 (1969): 
[T]he testimony of each witness should be taken separate and apart from, and 
not within the hearing of, either the applicant or of any other witness, and both 
the applicant and each of the witnesses should be required to state in and as part 
of the final proof testimony given by them that they have given such testimony 
without any actual knowledge of any statement made in the testimony of • • • 
others. 
293. See McCarty, supra note IO, at 178, and the Interior Department decisions 
cited therein. See also note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
294. Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
295. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) provides that 
"each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published 
rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure 
to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person." The Act 
grants district courts jurisdiction to enjoin agencies from withholding agency records; 
and it further provides that such court actions for injunction shall be tried de novo, 
that the burden is on the agency to sustain its action, and that such actions shall take 
precedence over other cases on the court's docket. 
296. 252 U.S. 450 (1920). 
297. 252 U.S. at 464. See also United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 
190 U.S. 316 (1903). 
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precedent, it probably does not adequately reflect the manner in 
which courts today are likely to view factual determinations of the 
Department. Apparently some distinction is made by the courts ac-
cording to the purpose for which the departmental factual deter-
mination is made. If the function is essentially adjudicatory, such 
as when the applicant has a statutory right to a certain disposition 
upon proof of requisite facts, the findings of the Secretary may be 
more closely examined by a reviewing court, even if, as under the 
Mineral Leasing Act,298 the statutory right is not one for which any 
statute requires an administrative hearing.299 However, if the func-
tion is not essentially adjudicatory, but rather is one connected with 
an adjudication of an application seeking an exercise of discretion 
or policy, the deference accorded to the administrative determina-
tion seems to follow the established trail.300 
It may be stated with little fear of exaggeration that the primary 
purpose of judicial review of administrative action is to guard 
against departures by government officials from their legal authority 
and thus to help ensure that the administration remains within the 
legal bounds intended by the legislature. That precept is embodied 
in the judicial-review provisions of the AP A301 and is reflected in 
the traditional form of review, the officer's suit, in which a departure 
from law is alleged. Against that background, it may be somewhat 
surprising to discover that courts accord deference to administrative 
determinations not only on questions of fact, but, at least in the 
public-lands area, on questions of law as well. 
With respect to matters of statutory interpretation, it is fre-
quently stated that "courts will not hesitate to review the Secretary's 
interpretation to determine if it accords with the language of the 
statute and the purpose of the statute, gleaned primarily from its 
legislative history."302 But at the same time, it is said that the Secre-
tary's construction is entitled to great weight and is not normally 
overturned unless a different construction is plainly required.303 
With respect to statutory interpretation by the Secretary, the latter 
298. 30 u.s.c. §§ 181-287 (1964). 
299. In some such cases, however-those dealing with the validity of mining claims 
for example-the Department has ruled that APA-type hearings are to be used, even 
though not required by statute. See Keith v. O'Leary, 63 Interior Dec. 341 (1956). See 
also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958). See generally Sperling 8: Cooney, 
supra note 216, at 446. 
300. See, e.g., Palmer v. Dredge Corp., 398 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1968); Ferry v. Udall, 
336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965); Hamel v. Nelson, 226 
F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal. 1963). 
301. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
302. Sperling 8: Cooney, supra note 216, at 444 8: n.84, citing, inter alia, Seaton v. 
Texas Co., 256 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958); California Oil Co. v. Udall, Civil No. 5729 
(D.N.M., Jan. 15, 1965). 
303. Sperllp.g 8: Cooney, supra :note 216, at 445. 
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approach is difficult to fault, for it would clearly not be desirable if 
large segments of public administration were subject to disruption 
every time a court happened to prefer its own statutory interpreta-
tion to that of the Secretary. 
It is with respect to interpretation of departmental regulations 
that one begins to doubt the wisdom of according a broad deference 
to the Secretary's interpretation. In this area, the Secretary is given 
more deference than he is even for factual determinations; factual 
determinations must be based on "substantial evidence," but inter-
pretations of regulations may be upheld if there are "plausible 
grounds" for the Secretary's interpretation.804 At first glance, it 
might seem that interpretation of regulations is the area in which 
deference is most appropriate-the problems may be complex, and 
the administrative officers presumably have the familiarity and ex-
pertise to deal with those problems. Yet from the standpoint of 
persons who must deal with the administrators and their interpre-
tations, the picture is less clear. The Secretary is granted broad 
powers to formulate regulations, and he may be bound by those 
regulations.305 Regulations are-or at any rate ought to be-more 
specific than their authorizing statutes, and hence regulations can 
provide courts with a convenient gauge from which to determine 
whether an officer has exceeded his legal bounds. In view of what 
appears to be the Department's long-standing distaste for judicial 
review of its actions, 306 it might be expected that in formulating 
regulations the Department would seek to furnish the courts with 
as little room for interpretation as possible, at least with respect to 
matters which border on policy. That indeed seems to be the case. 
A few hours of wading through the Department's regulations suf-
fice to convince one that much of the regulatory material is prolix 
paraphrase of the underlying statute. True, in certain highly devel-
oped areas, such as grazing, the regulations are quite specific.307 But 
in volatile areas which have strong policy implications, such as 
classification, the regulations carefully go no further than does the 
statute in restricting official discretion;308 and with respect to the 
segregation provisions, they seem even to expand upon the broad 
discretion conferred by the statute.309 It is not an adequate answer 
304. See, e.g., Udall v. Oelschlaeger, 389 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. Udall v. 
Tallman, 380 U.S. I (1965); Robertson v. Udall, 349 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Duesing 
v. Udall, 350 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 912 (1965). 
305. Cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (adherence by Secretary to his 
regulations deprives him of the summary power that he would have had absent the 
regulations). 
306. See text accompanying note 278 supra. 
307. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 4100-30 (1969) (grazing administration). 
308. See generally 43 C.F.R. § 2410 (1969). 
309. See text accompanying note 142 supra. 
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to say that if discretion is unobjectionable when conferred by stat-
ute, it is similarly unobjectionable when found in the regulations. 
The crucial difference is that the statute confers discretion upon 
the Secretary, an executive official, whereas the regulations, as a 
practical matter, confer that discretion upon various lesser admin-
istrators. One result of conferring broad discretion upon lesser of-
ficials is that opportunities for judicial observation and inquiry into 
administrative processes are minimal. Persons having an interest in 
the highly important classification decisions are placed at an addi-
tional disadvantage by the failure of the regulations to establish any 
clear administrative appeal procedures by which interested persons 
can effectively make known their views to executive officers of the 
Department. 310 
b. Mandamus proceedings. The scope of review in mandamus 
proceedings is much narrower than that in AP A proceedings, both 
as to questions of fact and to questions of law. In general, the 
plaintiff must show that the defendant officer "owes a duty" to the 
plaintiff, and the courts may limit themselves to compelling the per-
formance of that duty only when "the duty in a particular situation 
is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to 
a positive command."311 Few statutes are wholly free from doubt; 
and with respect to the mandamus remedy, courts show "great defer-
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency 
charged with its administration."312 Thus, even if the officer's func-
tion in question is entirely adjudicatory, as it is in determining 
whether a mining claimant has complied with statutory criteria 
which create a right to a patent, that officer probably cannot be com-
pelled by mandamus to take certain action, such as to issue the 
patent, because the officer may be making a statutory interpretation 
as well as a factual determination. In effect, then, the officer has 
discretion not only to find the facts, but also to choose the law.813 
Conceivably the apparently greater deference accorded admin-
istrative interpretations when relief is sought by mandamus rather 
than by other means could lead to a situation in which the statutory 
interpretation that is applied in large cases in which the claimant 
can meet the requirements for federal-question jurisdiction may be 
a different statutory interpretation from that accorded to claimants 
whose only practical access to judicial review is by mandamus. Such 
a result would be anomalous, to say the least; and it is perhaps one 
factor that has prompted some commentators to call for a less re-
310. See text accompanying note 131-35 supra. 
311. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930). 
312. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
313. JAFFE 183-84. 
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strictive approach to mandamus relief under the Mandamus and 
Venue Act.314 
Ill. .ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. General Considerations 
An examination of the administrative procedures governing the 
public lands and of the administrative and judicial treatment of 
disputes arising under those procedures suggests the existence of 
needless complexity and of vast administrative discretion subject to 
no adequate control by either the courts or the executive. It is sug-
gested that public-lands administration, and certainly those persons 
who deal with the lands agencies or who othenvise have an interest 
in the management of public lands, would stand to benefit from an 
expansion in the availability of judicial review. 
Many of the obstacles to judicial review of administrative deci-
sions seem to be irrational, at least in the public-lands context. One 
example is the minimum amount necessary for federal-question 
jurisdiction. Of questionable value in any context,315 it can in the 
public-lands area serve to inflict unnecessary hardship on would-be 
litigants who, if they cannot demonstrate that 10,000 dollars is in 
controversy, must either structure their complaints to meet the tech-
nicalities of mandamus jurisdiction or bring their actions in the 
District of Columbia-often a distant, expensive, and unfamiliar 
forum.316 What good purpose is served by that requirement is not 
clear; what is clear is that the jurisdictional-amount requirement 
promotes disuniformity of decision, with success often depending 
upon whether a court accepts at face value a plaintiff's assertion of 
jurisdiction or contrives to find jurisdiction under some other stat-
ute such as the AP A. 
A related obstacle to judicial review, and one which is similarly 
of questionable value, is the necessity for meeting narrow technical 
requirements in order to gain mandamus jurisdiction in the federal 
district courts.317 The inquiries necessitated are whether the defen-
dant "owes a duty" to a plaintiff and whether the act sought is 
"ministerial" or "discretionary." Some commentators have suggested 
that this narrow construction of the requirements for mandamus is 
not in harmony with a supposed intent of Congress to confer on 
district courts jurisdiction for land disputes generally.318 In any 
314. See Byse &: Fiocca, supra note 214, at 331-36; Parr, supra note 278, at 20-21. 
315, See generally Cramton 436-46. 
316. See text accompanying notes 231-37 supra. 
317. See text accompanying notes 240, 311 supra. 
318. See, e.g., Parr, supra note 278, at 21. 
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event, the operation of that judicial approach is rendered some-
what irrational by the fact that in many cases a plaintiff who is 
denied relief in the district court because of failure to meet man-
damus requirements can still obtain relief by means of a change of 
forum and a change in pleading.319 
Another needless obstacle to judicial review is the possibility 
that relief may be denied if the case happens to be one in which it 
is necessary to join as defendants both federal officers and persons 
who are not federal officers. The restriction of the district court's 
venue by the Mandamus and Venue Act320 to situations in which 
"each" defendant is a federal official works a needless and irrational 
hardship on plaintiffs who, because of that quirk in the statute, may 
be obliged to sojourn in the District of Columbia if they want to 
obtain judicial review.321 
Another obstacle to judicial review is sovereign immunity. That 
doctrine, although arguably less irrational in purpose than the fore-
going jurisdictional problems, is at least as effective in diverting 
courts' attention from the merits to artificial issues; and the doctrine 
is probably even less consistent in application than are the juris-
dictional problems.322 It might be argued that sovereign immunity 
is less objectionable when applied to public-lands controversies than 
it is when applied to other areas. After all, the sale and granting of 
leases and permits on the public lands is an exercise by the Govern-
ment of its proprietorship. Broad discretion, it might be argued, is 
peculiarly appropriate when the Government acts as proprietor dis-
pensing gratuities; and if the Larson doctrine results in broadening 
that discretion, it is not great cause for concern. That analysis, how-
ever, fails in many respects. It displays as a premise the proposition 
that so long as the Government is exercising its proprietorship and 
not regulating personal or property rights, the idea that administra-
tive agencies should be subject to judicial control is somehow less 
applicable. Whatever merit that proposition may have is diminished 
when it is realized that as a practical matter in most public-lands 
cases, it is not the "Government" acting, but a lower- or middle-
echelon bureaucrat. That latter observation should prompt at least 
some inquiry into the process of administrative decision making in 
order to help ensure a proper nexus between the administrative de-
cision and the policy of the executive to whom the discretion has 
been delegated. Hence, even when sovereign immunity concerns 
only proprietary functions, that doctrine may afford too much shelter. 
Moreover, sovereign immunity in public-lands cases is not limited 
319. See text acocmpanying notes 225-28 supra. 
320. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964). See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra. 
321. See text accompanying notes 225-28 supra. 
322, See text accompanying notes 193-202 supra. 
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to strictly proprietary situations; it may also operate in cases in-
volving statutory rights and privileges or even real-property rights. 
In fact, it seems that the doctrine is less likely to be applied in cases 
such as Udall v. Talman,323 which involve a clear propriety function, 
than it is in cases in which "proprietorship" is conspicuously absent, 
such as lifalone v. Bowdoin,324 Simons v. Vinson,325 and Gardner v. 
Harris.326 Whatever virtue sovereign immunity may have with re-
spect to proprietary actions is clearly lacking when its application 
operates to permit administrative officials to accomplish by their 
wrongful actions what the Government could not accomplish legally 
by way of eminent domain. It is to be hoped that the near future 
will see some statutory alleviation of the hardships permitted by the 
doctrine as it is now applied.327 
Another aspect of existing standards for judicial review which 
may work a substantial hardship on a party aggrieved by an admin-
istrative decision concerns the scope of review granted. In general, 
courts quite rightly review only "questions of law" and not ques-
tions of fact. So long as the fact-finding process of the administrative 
agency conforms to general notions or fundamental fairness, there 
is no objection to that judicial policy. But with the exception of 
the few instances in which formal APA-type hearings are available, 
the fact-finding practices of the lands agencies of the Department 
of the Interior leave some doubt as to whether considerations of 
fundamental fairness are really satisfied. When an applicant is 
denied opportunity to confront, or even to hear the testimony of, 
adverse witnesses; when he is given no opportunity to see the hear-
ing examiner's proposed findings, but must on appeal shoot in the 
dark at what may be important issues; and when the facts which are 
relied upon for the final administrative decision and which will 
comprise the factual "record" for judicial review may have been 
gathered by faceless investigators during the course of an appeal, 
there is at least some question concerning the fairness or accuracy of 
the resulting record.328 
Even the review given to administrative determinations of ques-
tions of law may be sharply limited by judicial deference to admin-
istrative decisions.329 Substantial deference is given to secretarial 
determinations of statutory authority; and in that regard, at least 
323. 380 U.S. I (1965). 
324. 369 U.S. 643 (1962). 
325. 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968). 
326. 391 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968). 
327. Proposals for statutory reform of the sovereign immunity doctrine have been 
developed by Professors Byse and Cramton. See Byse 1525; Cramton 428. 
328. See text accompanying notes 40-45, 58-65, 289-94 supra. 
329. See text accompanying notes 302-14 supra. 
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some deference is necessary to ensure smooth administration. But 
administrative interpretations of regulations may be viewed by the 
courts with excessive deference, to be upset only if no plausible 
grounds for the administrative interpretation exist. The result seems 
to be the encouragement of vague and confusing regulations, of 
which nearly any interpretation may be deemed "plausible." Such 
regulations operate to foreclose judicial review and have the effect 
of shifting the element of discretion away from the executive of-
ficers, to whom it was granted by Congress, and toward the lower-
level administrators, whose control over fact finding and record 
making is likely to channel the interpretation and the result in the 
final administrative-and judicial-decision in any particular case. 
Moreover, the vague and obfuscatory regulations seemingly encour-
aged by the deferential policy tend to afford only uncertainty to 
persons who will deal with the Department. One result can be 
wasted effort, because the lack of specific rules and regulations may 
serve to encourage persons to apply for land dispositions which they 
would not have sought if they had had advance knowledge of the 
Department's policy. Another apparent result of inadequate regula-
tions is the emphasis given to individual case adjudications, in 
which there may occur the announcement of policies having far-
reaching implications. There is at least a possibility that the deci-
sions reached in such cases are based on rather narrow considerations 
because third parties who stand to be affected by the general policy 
lack notice of the pending proceedings and therefore do not have 
the opportunity to participate in those proceedings; indeed, even if 
there were notice, those persons are probably not permitted to inter-
vene in such proceedings.330 
There seems to be no good reason why courts should continue to 
accord to administrative findings and actions under secretarial regu-
lations so strong a presumption of validity. No real purpose is served 
by that presumption; the underlying reason for it is probably the 
courts' reluctance to enter confusing areas which are thought to be 
better suited for the technical expertise of administrators than for 
judicial inquiry. But it might be questioned whether professional 
expertise is really a valid consideration in many disputes arising in 
the public-lands area. Perhaps the deference is appropriate in situa-
tions such as those long-term development projects which involve 
highly sophisticated questions of cost-benefit analysis; but such ques-
tions would rarely be present in homestead or grazing permit appli-
cations, and courts seem reasonably well suited to pass upon the 
fairness and legality of administrative decisions in such cases. The 
benefits of judicial review which would accrue in those areas could 
be gained by discarding the strong presumption of validity currently 
330. See text accompanying notes 112-18 supra. 
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accorded to administrative findings and regulation interpretations. 
Such a shift need not mean that the courts would have to become in-
volved in the highly technical determinations in which there is good 
reason for judicial deference. Courts seem generally aware of their 
limitations, and it is reasonable to assume that there would be few 
instances in which courts would involve themselves in technical 
problems that are better left to the experts. 
B. Treatment of Third-Party Interests 
The public lands have national importance as well as impor-
tance for large segments of local communities in the western states. 
The interests of the public generally in the uses made of the public 
lands suggest the need for some public voice in determining policies 
of wide-ranging importance. Moreover, the strong impact which the 
management of the public lands may have on local communities 
with respect to both land-use planning and economic well-being 
suggests the need for some kind of institutionalized consideration of 
what may loosely be termed third-party interests-that is, the inter-
ests of persons not directly concerned in any given controversy. 
At present, little recognition is given to those third-party inter-
ests either in the administrative process or in the courts. In most 
administrative determinations, the status accorded to third parties 
is that of a "protestant." As such, one has no right to appeal, since 
that privilege is limited to "aggrieved persons who are parties to the 
case" and who are "adversely affected." If a third party's complaint 
is related to what he apprehends as being "the public interest," it 
might be expected, as a general matter, that such an interest would 
be more likely to receive fair consideration if it were heard at a 
level near that of the policy-making executive than it would in the 
local land office. The possibility of insufficient consideration at the 
local level seems particularly strong if the dispute concerns a dis-
position which could benefit a local economy, but which might be 
objected to by third parties seeking to represent, for example, con-
servation interests. If indeed there is thought to be a general public 
interest in such disposition, it is desirable to establish some admin-
istrative procedure whereby mere protestants might have an oppor-
tunity to be heard on other than the local level. The need to estab-
lish some procedure of this type is heightened by the fact that case 
dispositions have assumed great importance on account of the ab-
sence of adequate regulations which might have been promulgated 
if greater consideration were given to general public interests. 
An objection to providing an expanded forum for consideration 
of third-party views may be found in the statement of the regula-
tions that decisions generally do not become effective until all ap-
peals have been exhausted; clearly it would not be in the interests 
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of efficient administration to permit a disgruntled "self-appointed 
guardian of the public interest" to delay a land disposition to which 
no one immediately concerned has objected. The problem that such 
a delay could pose is aggravated by the fact that administrative ap-
peal can often be an interminable process,331 despite the Depart-
ment's strict enforcement of filing deadlines. 
This objection could be alleviated, however, and side benefits 
realized, if the processing of appeals could be expedited. The stock 
answer to the problem of administrative delay is to call for an 
increased staff. but that approach seems unlikely at a time of pur-
ported government austerity. Moreover, an increased staff might not 
provide a satisfactory solution, particularly if bureaucracy really 
does possess an ability for an infinite expansion of work. A better 
approach, then, would be to reduce the volume of appeals, and it 
seems that a significant step could be taken in that direction if there 
were better departmental dissemination of public information. If 
better regulatory material were made available-a result that could 
be encouraged by the courts through a reduced deference to depart-
mental interpretations of vague regulations-presumably fewer fu-
tile appeals would be attempted. 
Another manner in which objections to permitting third-party 
appeals might be met is through the Secretary's exercise of his cur-
rently available discretionary power to permit initial decisions or 
portions of them to become immediately effective.332 One difficulty 
with that approach, however, is that applicants would still be re-
luctant to commence operations in reliance upon an initial decision 
if that decision were subject to appellate alteration. Moreover, third 
parties might object that the feared harm to the land might be an 
accomplished fact by the time their appeal could receive appellate 
consideration. But both difficulties could be minimized if there were 
provision for according priority treatment to administrative appeals 
in cases in which the initial decision has been made immediately 
effective. Coupled with the reduced appellate workload which could 
result from making better regulatory material available in order to 
permit parties to gauge more accurately the probable outcome on 
appeal, a provision for priority appeal could adequately satisfy the 
objections to permitting third-party appeals. 
An area in which there is a severe need for better attention to 
third-party interests is that of classification. At the present time, 
classification does not ensure the consideration of, or even notice to, 
third parties; and the segregation provisions render administrative 
331. In some instances administrative proceedings may take up to five years. See 
Carver, The Federal Proprietary Function-A Neglected Aspect of Federal Administra-
tive Law, 19 ABA AD. L. REv. 107, 113 (1966). 
332. See text accompanying note 268 supra. 
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appeal nearly meaningless for everyone concerned.333 It is at the 
classification stage that policy determinations affecting broad areas 
are made, and it is at that stage that consideration of the claims of 
third parties representing the "public interest" would most appro-
priately take place. Yet "public hearings" are required only for very 
large classifications; and the efficacy of such hearings is uncertain, 
since the regulations provide only that the "authorized officer" con-
sider the issues raised. There is no provision for compiling from 
those hearings a factual record for review; indeed, it appears that 
standard administrative review is not permitted and that the only 
further review allowed is that of "petitioning" the Secretary by some 
unstated method.334 It is not clear who may petition; but it is clear 
that no review at all is possible until the initial classification deci-
sion is published, and that such publication may occur as much as 
four years after segregation and uses consistent with the proposed 
classification have begun. At the very least, then, there should be 
explicit provision for administrative review of proposed classifica-
tions as well as of the more final "initial classifications." Whatever 
harm there would be in permitting review of proposed classifications 
seems minimal in comparison to the present situation in which the 
"authorized officer" who proposes the classification is able to exer-
cise nearly all the broad discretion which was granted to the Secre-
tary under the 1964 statute.335 
The same considerations which support increased administrative 
review of third-party interests also lend support to arguments for 
judicial review of such interests. If there is a need for greater con-
sideration of the interests of the "public" when decisions having a 
broad policy impact are made, and if therefore there is a need for 
administrative review of such decisions, then it seems appropriate to 
promote fairness and consistency of decision by having judicial re-
view available as well. But judicial review of a proposed classifica-
tion, for example, might entail a departure from many traditional 
standards for judicial review. Technically, the proposed classifica-
tion is not a final decision, and it may not become so until the 
period for petitioning the Secretary has expired.336 But since there 
is no provision preventing an initial classification from being op-
erational before appeal, it could reasonably be argued that the 
decision is final when the initial classification is published. In addi-
tion, it might be argued that in some cases, the decision is final as a 
practical matter as soon as it is proposed by the authorized officer, 
for that proposal commences the segregation thereby opening the 
333. See text accompanying notes 137-42 supra. 
334. See text accompanying note 133 supra. 
335. 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964). See also text accompanying notes 140-42 supra. 
336. See text accompanying notes 252-63 supra. 
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land for consistent uses. If the harm alleged is that the uses permit-
ted by the proposed classification will make the land unsuitable for 
the purpose for which it is argued that the land ought to be classi-
fied, then it might be possible to fit that argument within the tradi-
tional standards for irreparable harm.337 
An additional barrier to judicial review of a proposed classifica-
tion is the problem of standing.338 If the person seeking review of 
the decision is the petitioner whose application initially triggered 
the classification process, the standing problem is solved relatively 
easily. But if the party seeking review is, for instance, a conservation 
group, that requirement is not so easily satisfied. In recent years, 
however, there has been a substantial relaxation in standing require-
ments, particularly for public-interest groups and conservation 
groups. Of particular interest in the latter regard are Scenic Hudson 
Preservation Conference v. FPC,339 and Citizens Committee for the 
Hudson Valley v. Volpe,340 both of which permitted standing for 
conservation groups. But those cases were decided by reference to 
particular statutes which directed the agencies to give consideration 
to scenic and conservation interests,341 whereas in disputes concern-
ing public lands administered by the Department of the Interior, 
such specific statutes are seldom available. That distinction may 
have been rendered less important, however, by a recent Supreme 
Court decision in which Scenic Hudson and United Church of 
Christ v. FCC342 were cited for the proposition that the interest 
which produced standing may sometimes "reflect 'aesthetic, conser-
vational, and recreational' as well as economic values."343 Moreover, 
general statutes dealing with public lands contain references to 
337. An important element in determining whether administrative remedies have 
been exhausted is whether an adequate administrative remedy is available. JAFF!-
426-32. Traditionally, an administrative remedy is inadequate if it does not insure 
against "irreparable injury" to the aggrieved party. Id. 428-30. See also Isbrandtsen 
v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
338. See notes 156-74 supra and accompanying text. 
339. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). For further discussion of this case, see Sive, 
Securing, Examining, and Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, 
68 MICH. L. REv. 1175 (1970). 
340. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For further discussion of this case, see Sive, 
supra note 339, at 1182-85. 
341. Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W, 
4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970) (data processing companies have standing to challenge 
legality of bank's entry into data processing business); Office of Communication of the 
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (standing for citizen's 
group to challenge FCC license reviewed); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 
650, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (standing for citizen's group to sue based on language in 
statute directing concern for local needs). 
342. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
343. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 38 U.S.L.W, 
4193 (U.S. March 3, 1970). 
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wilderness or conservation considerations,344 and perhaps it would 
not entail too great a logical jump to go from standing under the 
Transportation Act345 or the Federal Power Commission statute346 
to an inference of standing from such statutes as the Multiple Use 
and Sustained Yield Act347 under which classification takes place. 
Thus, the traditional barriers to review at the classification stage 
do not appear insuperable for a sympathetic court. The truly diffi-
cult issues with respect to judicial review for conservationists or 
others challenging proposed lands classifications concern the ques-
tion of administrative discretion and the proper relationship of the 
judiciary to matters relating to administrative discretion. Few 
imaginable functions of the Department of the Interior are more 
policy-related or involve more discretion than does classification. 
The fundamental question, then, is whether it is proper for courts 
to become involved at all in matters so inherently discretionary. In-
deed, there may be some very serious doubts that it would be wise 
to characterize as questions of law such delicate decisions as the 
balancing of the interests of conservationists against the interests of 
the public and the nation in the development of resources and in 
the supply of low-cost building materials and fuels. The nation's 
needs and policies in this area are volatile, and reduction of those 
issues to questions of law might result in stifling the flexibility neces-
sary to meet national needs. Such decisions, it may reasonably be 
argued, should be left to political determination. 
Yet one may question whether these decisions are really made 
by political determination in the sense desired. Indeed, in view of 
the fact that low-level administrators apparently have broad dis-
cretion for classification-due in part perhaps to the lack of ade-
quate secretarial regulations-one might question how responsive 
classification proposals are to political direction except in the very 
broadest sense. First, it is uncertain how far down into the bureau-
cratic complex the political pressures can extend effectively. The 
frequent allusions to the control of the executive by the bureaucracy 
suggest that effective political control may be an illusory goal. Sec-
ond, even if political pressures are felt by the administrators who 
collectively wield the power of bureaucracy, it is doubtful that those 
344. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 14ll(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); cf. 16 U.S.C. § 460(l) (1964). 
345. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). Road 
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
346. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 803 (1964); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
347. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-18 (1964). Conservation interests which arguably are recog-
nized in that Act are found in the criteria for classification, which include, but are 
not limited to, fish and wildlife development and utilization, outdoor recreation, 
wilderness preservation, and ecology. 
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pressures will be of the sort envisaged by proponents of political 
control. That doubt is based not on any devil theory of corrupt 
politics, but simply on the likelihood that, as a practical matter, 
whatever pressures are felt by low-level administrators in a geo-
graphically decentralized administrative structure are likely to be 
parochial in nature and hence not responsive to political guidance 
from the executive policy makers, except perhaps in those very large 
cases which assume the proportions of a national scandal. 
In this connection, limited judicial activity could promote an 
appropriate balance. By exerting pressure on administrative agen-
cies to reach their decisions in an open manner and to afford a voice 
to the interested public, the courts could encourage a more respon-
sive administration and at the same time could avoid excessive judi-
cial interference in questions of discretionary policy. That pressure 
could be brought through judicial emphasis not on the substantive 
policy issues involved, but rather on the procedures by which de-
cisions are made. 
The device available for such an approach is that of remand, and 
indeed there is a significant degree of precedent for that approach. 
Many state courts have extensively utilized the device of remand to 
enforce upon administrators of the public resources what has been 
termed the public-trust doctrine.348 In fact, state courts have applied 
that doctrine even to legislatures as a positive limitation on the 
powers of those bodies.349 Federal courts have not so applied the 
doctrine as a check on the Congress, and probably neither can nor 
should go that far. But federal courts have increasingly used the 
remand device to express dissatisfaction with certain administrative 
procedures and to prod agencies into greater consideration of a 
broad range of interests, including conservational interests, in mak-
ing administrative decisions. In Udall v. FPC,350 for example, a de-
cision of the Federal Power Commission was remanded for further 
consideration on the ground that the Commission had not exercised 
the "informed judgment" required by a relevant statute. Similarly, 
remand was utilized in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
FPC351 and Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe.352 
348. See, e.g., Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd 
on rehearing, 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); Texas East Transmission Corp. v. 
Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See generally Sax, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 471, 491-556 (1970). 
349. See, e.g., Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commn., 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 
114 (1966); Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, afjd. on 
rehearing, 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W .2d 40 (1952). 
350. 387 U.S. 428 (1967). 
351. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
352. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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Admittedly, these cases involved special circumstances and statutes 
and are hence distinguishable from situations relating to the activi-
ties of the Department of the Interior. But even with respect to 
review of the decisions of the Department of the Interior, remand 
as a gesture of judicial dissatisfaction is not unknown, even when 
the power exercised by the Secretary is entirely discretionary.353 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the next few years, controversies over the public lands are 
likely to reverse their long-term declining trend and to increase in 
attention and importance. If nothing else, the current political pop-
ularity of environmental issues seems to ensure that increased atten-
tion will be given to the uses made of the federal public lands. 
Moreover, the report and recommendations of the Public Land Law 
Review Commission, due June 30, 1970, is certain to spark new de-
bate concerning uses and dispositions of the public lands.354 Indeed, 
many of the current laws and practices, such as those relating to 
classification, are nominally temporary pending the recommenda-
tions of the Commission.355 Nevertheless, current practices remain 
important, for decisions made now will have long-range effects, and 
current practice seems likely to continue at least until Congress acts 
on the Commission's recommendations. 
Current practices could benefit greatly from reform. The prac-
tice of lands administration seems to be one of paternalism and 
broad discretion throughout the administrative structure, with in-
adequate procedures and public information for persons dealing 
with the public-lands agencies. Departmental appeals procedures 
are frequently inadequate, and the availability of judicial review 
of wrongful or arbitrary action is hampered by numerous artificial 
barriers which serve little or no rational purpose. As a result, there 
is a substantial need for increased judicial and legislative attention 
to the practices of the lands agencies, in order to encourage better 
rule-making and adjudicatory procedures and in order to ensure 
that when the Department exercises its discretionary authority over 
the public lands, it gives adequate consideration to the various pub-
lic interests at stake. 
353. See, e.g., Tagula v. Gorsuch, 411 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1969); Pressentin v. Seaton, 
284 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Secretary directed to consider appeal of mining claimant 
whose filing had been rejected as untimely). See also Denison v. Udall, 248 F. Supp. 942 
(D. Ariz. 1965) (court reversed Secretary's denial of application for mining patent and 
remanded for further proceeding); accord, Richardson v. Udall, 253 F. Supp. 72 (D. 
Idaho 1966) (homestead application). 
354. The legislation of 1964 created the Public Land Law Review Commission, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1391-400 (1964), the purpose of which is to make a systematic study of long-
term needs concerning the public lands and then to report to Congress with recom-
mendations for future use and disposition of the public lands. 
355. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964) (introductory clause). 
